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I am an immigrant or, better still, a cosmopolitan citizen. In the last 
decade, which represents most of my adult life, I have lived in eight 
different countries: Brazil, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden, England, and Norway. Through this journey, I have learned 
different languages and cultures, and worked in different 
philosophical traditions. When I first left home, being abroad put 
me in constant contact with the new, the different, and the other. 
With that, I dealt with the great enthusiasm of a curious and young 
explorer. At first, everything I learned, I learned by comparing home 
and abroad. In order to be familiarised with new ways of living and 
of organising societies, I used to relate the novelty to the previous 
knowledge of the world that I had from my hometown. For some 
time in the learning process, there was always a reference, a 
theoretical act of going back home, that kept me connected while 
living abroad.  
At some point, however, these references got lost. My sense of 
belonging became diffuse, and so did my conception of otherness. I 
understood that many differences might lie in the eyes of the 
observer, not necessarily in the things, states, facts or actions 
themselves. When the observer chooses to stress and value 
homogeneity in narrow terms, at the limit, one will most likely not 
find it outside the mirror. Everything other than the self can appear 
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alien and be portrayed as a threat. On the contrary, when the 
observer focuses on a broader conception of homogeneity, she 
might become able to disclose and connect similar patterns in 
different cultures, languages, ethnic groups or classes, the whole 
world becomes one.  
The trustees of the Pitt Rivers Museum of Anthropology of 
Oxford, England, have challenged the view of the narrow-minded 
observers. They did that with great success when organising 
artefacts and tools not by country or continent, but by functionality. 
There we see that by adapting to the availability of resources, many 
tools and techniques were similar across the globe, long before 
contemporary globalisation. While the “slynge”, a type of weapon 
made of weights covered in leather tied together by chords, was 
used in the North Pole, the “boleadeira” was used in the South Pole. 
What changes is mainly the name of the tool, not its characteristics 
or function. Capturing these nuances in the places I have been since 
I left home has considerably changed my view of the world. I found 
new homes abroad and understood that national borders may be 
much more meaningless and unnecessarily controlled than I once 
thought them to be. And it was in the context of extensive mobility 
that, from an immigrant, I started to define myself, but also others, 
as cosmopolitan citizens by default.  
In my extended sojourns and trips, however, I have 
encountered many people who did not enjoy of the same mobility as 
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I did and continue to do. This was simply because they did not have 
sufficient means for traveling and/or did not meet the requirements 
for the visa applications vastly colouring the front and back cover of 
this thesis. These visas are expensive commodities. It is not only the 
administrative fees that go well above the minimal monthly wage in 
some countries, but the money one has to have saved in a bank 
account to prove that one can support oneself during the whole stay 
in a foreign country, sometimes for a year. Much of the prejudice, 
distrust, and fear reflecting on immigration policies prevented these 
people from exercising their freedom of choice and having equal 
opportunities in life just because they are disadvantaged from the 
start. Those who can exercise these rights usually do so because 
they can pay for it. The others are taking chances, gambling with 
their own lives. At international airports, I saw anxious people 
standing in long checkpoint queues, afraid of being deported after 
desperately having spent their life savings in the hope of a new life. 
Some of them were close family members of those immigrants who, 
with a great deal of luck, had previously managed to cross the 
borders. Most of them wanted just to be a family again, entering as 
tourists with the intention to stay.  
Through local immigrant networks, I was also made familiar 
with those who were not even able to access the international 
airports. This is not only because the related costs were 
unaffordable, but also because the “tourism excuse” simply does not 
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work for everybody. Unemployed individuals who lack insurance or 
general social assistance cannot use the “tourism excuse” in order 
to migrate, as they rarely have the privilege of taking holidays, much 
less going for holidays abroad. They remain smuggled in the back of 
trucks or forced to take the risk in precarious boats and rafts across 
the ocean. The numbers of casualties related to border crossing have 
skyrocketed since I first started work on this thesis. According to 
the Missing Migrants Project sponsored by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), the causalities have almost 
doubled in the last few years. January to late September, 2015, 
recorded almost 4,000 deaths, at an average of 14 persons a day. 
The size of the problem is excruciating and the fatalities related to 
immigration are not restricted to the border areas of, for example, 
the Mediterranean, South Pacific, U.S/Mexico border, Caribbean, 
North Africa, Middle East, or Calais. They have spread to the 
streets. Buildings, buses, tube trains and airplanes have been 
bombed in attacks against diversity in Amsterdam, London, Madrid, 
Oslo and Paris, to name a few; and persons and children of 
immigrant background have been shot in selected neighbourhoods 
by people targeting the vulnerable. 
With time, I began to feel guilty instead of privileged for never 
being stopped at the border, never having a visa denied and never 
having suffered any violence towards my otherness. My studies of 
the classic texts in philosophy became, from a personal dimension, 
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insignificant to me. I then found myself highly provoked by this 
contemporary problem of immigration and borders that unevenly 
affects so many lives. Thus, instead of pursuing a historical or 
purely theoretical thesis, I was driven to pursue a political 
philosophical committed not only to the ideal of global justice, but 
to the reality of all these immigrants who, in one way or another, 
have crossed my path.  
My motivation was to investigate the pillars behind the 
restrictive understanding of citizenship that led to the current 
practices of border control and exclusion. Citizenship is a complex 
concept. It means equal status of rights, political and social 
participation, but it also means belonging to a community and 
national membership, which is historically tied to nationhood and 
national identity (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353). In “The Future 
Governance of Citizenship”, Dora Kostakoupoulou (2008) proposes 
to disentangle these always changing and conflicting dimensions of 
citizenship throughout history in order to grasp its contemporary 
function. Citizenship is according to her a dynamic and necessarily 
polysemantic concept and our task is to constantly unveil its 
transformations in order to adapt to the needs of our times. 
Although I agree with her that we need a concept that responds to 
our current challenges and acknowledge the merits of her work, I do 
not think that, when referring to practices, the loaded concept of 
citizenship can ever be totally free from the parochialisms that our 
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times require. To me, it seems that no matter how much we want to 
suppress or smother the parochial element of citizenship when 
theorising, citizenship linked to nationality is still often implicitly 
behind our current practices of border control and exclusion. To 
preserve conflicting meanings in a concept, in my view, is a form of 
intellectual capitulation that does not help to enlighten 
contradictory practices, but rather the opposite; it might even help 
to reinforce them.  Even if, for example, supranational forms of 
citizenship such as the EU Citizenship have emerged, they are still 
parasitic on national citizenship to one of the state members. Even 
if the ius soli is celebrated as an advancement of a denationalised 
form of citizenship, very few states, none in the EU currently, adopt 
unconditional ius soli policies to the detriment of ius sanguinis 
(Honohan 2010). To grant citizenship to foreigners in terms of ius 
domicilii, these same states do require sufficient assimilation to 
community values (e.g. French community values, British values, 
Dutch values); values that do not necessarily reflect only political 
allegiance. Therefore, in order to highlight the contradictions of 
these practices obscured by the ambiguous concept of citizenship, I 
decided not to use it and replace it with more specific terms, as 
follows:  
When I want to refer to the parochial element of citizenship 
tied to nationhood and national identity, I use the term national 
citizenship. When I want to oppose national citizenship in the 
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abstract level, I use the term cosmopolitan citizenship referring to all 
individuals belonging to the globe. When I want to refer to 
citizenship meaning purely formal equality of rights or political 
participation, I use the term state membership. By distinguishing state 
members and national citizens instead of blurring them both into a 
confusing concept of citizenship, I want to show the important 
differences between political and national members that might not 
and perhaps should not need to be overcome in order to guarantee 
the access of basic rights in our pluralistic societies. In terms of 
rights and political participation, it is of course important from a 
liberal democratic perspective that state members and national 
citizens are considered equal, but this does not mean that we 
should necessarily require immigrants to become national citizens 
in order to grant them access to these basic rights.  Considering 
this, the overarching aim of this thesis is to develop the idea and 
significance of state membership becoming a question of individual 
choice. Without proposing the dissolution of the states or the 
abolition of national citizenship as an ordinary form of identity for 
those who see value in it, this thesis is a defence of freedom of 
human mobility and state membership across borders.  
In this sense, my thesis is for me a quest for justice, which I 
have embraced with great passion. It is the result of the recognition 
of injustices emerging from comparisons of different experiences of 
mobility across borders. Much of this passion I have saved for 
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articles of opinion and dissemination that are not included here, 
except one that is in the appendix. I chose to include this article 
here because it is my first publication in Norwegian and I wanted to 
express my deep cordiality to this country that has now become my 
home. I do hope that the readers can still feel the vibration 
motivated by my passion for the topic throughout the thesis even 
when I am analytically discussing concepts, definitions and policies 
at the normative and circumstantial levels. My goal is to propose a 
reconciliatory approach to the contradictions generated by border 
control and exclusion in times of increasing human mobility across 
borders. I hope this proposal will be sound enough to instigate new 
discussions in this ongoing and pressing debate on 
cosmopolitanism, immigration and borders. Thank you for your 









1.The Puzzle: International Human Mobility versus State Border 
Control 
Many factors nowadays are contributing to increasing the pressure 
for international human mobility. Among them are war and 
conflicts, globalisation, economic and career development, personal 
aspirations, family reunion, and climate change. The worldwide 
expansion of interconnectedness promoted by the spread of capital, 
technology, services and also values and culture has led to a 
considerable increase in the flow of persons across borders (Li 
2008:1). As communication and transport become more accessible, 
people aspire to build a new future for themselves and their families 
abroad.  
These increasing pressures for international human mobility, 
however, clash with the territorial rights of contemporary states 
that attempt to regulate the movement of persons across borders as 
an essential element of their sovereignty. Tensions emerge when 
states are no longer able to manage the effects of such factors and 
determine emigration and migration policies solely according to 
their national agendas. The limitations of the states’ action are 
multiple and they can refer to (i) the inability of states to deal alone 
with the magnitude of the factors that drive migration and (ii) the 
ongoing political shift from unilateral policy-making and internal 
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sovereignty towards the consolidation of international law and 
external sovereignty.1 While the first limitation can be said to be 
global (i.e., shared by every state independent of regime), the 
second presents a more significant challenge for liberal democracies. 
The first limitation is global because the driving forces of 
international mobility are becoming politically unmanageable at the 
state level. Experience has shown that no matter how much 
unilateral authority is imposed, or how much resource is allocated 
to border control, so-called ‘illegal migration’ cannot be stopped 
completely (Papademetriou 2005). Thus, states that exert close 
control on immigrants and forbid their citizens to leave the country 
or require them to apply for an ‘exit visa', such as North Korea and 
China, risk losing their sovereignty when confronted by 
uncontrollable mass immigration and emigration. The second 
limitation is more specific to liberal democracies because, in seeking 
economic development and social progress, liberal states agree to 
bind themselves together guided by the conjoint effort of promoting 
and protecting peace and human rights. 
From a Western perspective, the controls exercised by North 
Korea and China constitute a serious violation of basic human 
rights. Although international human rights law permits the 
                                         
1 Internal sovereignty concerns the relationship between a sovereign state and its 
subjects. External sovereignty concerns the relationship between sovereign 
states and other states. 
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signatory states to regulate the entry, residency and citizenship of 
foreigners in their territories, articles 13, 14 and 15 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights amends the right to 
emigrate, the right to return to one’s country of origin, the right to 
migrate within the state borders, the right to seek asylum abroad, 
and the right to a nationality or to change nationality. Thus, little 
seems to be left for states to determine regarding human mobility, 
and any attempt for a state to exert control on human mobility can, 
from a certain perspective, be considered a last resort to assert state 
sovereignty; but much of the struggle affecting many people’s lives 
arises from this. 
Up until now, states have been operating with different 
immigration policies. The visa requirements, application fees and 
the time for eligibility to permanent residency, for example, vary 
considerably from country to country. This gives the impression 
that this last resort of sovereignty over border control is, somehow, 
still preserved. However, more and more border control is escaping 
the scope of the states and being delegated to supranational 
structures not only with a common economic, but also a common 
political project, such as the European Union, Mercosur, Nordic 
Passport Union and several other multilateral agreements among 
states, allowing internal regional mobility. These agreements 
gradually lead to the standardisation of the immigration policies and 
challenge the conception of national sovereignty based on states’ 
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autonomy to determine their own policies and protect themselves 
from foreign domination. 
At the level of the European Union, these agreements already 
have a binding force and violations are brought to the European 
Court of Human Rights. But the question of how fragile these 
agreements are still remains. The UK, for example, was brought to 
court for violating refugee rights. Now, they recently decided in a 
referendum (23.06.2016) to quit the European Court in order to 
reclaim their autonomy over migration control. That being said, we 
can see that although international law is advancing towards deeper 
cooperation and coordination among states, and with that comes 
more freedom of mobility, these advancements are not without 
strong backlashes from states that want to preserve their internal 
sovereignty. The strength of these backlashes endangers even the 
already settled freedom of mobility enjoyed within certain unions 
and bilateral agreements. This shows that the conflicts between 
international and state sovereignty concerning border control are 
very much alive and must be discussed further. The pressing 
question that arises from this, then, is whether it is possible and, if 
it is, how to reconcile freedom of international human mobility with 
territorial states. 
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2.Relevance: Why is it important to reconcile the increasing 
international human mobility with territorial states? 
The tensions between the increasing international human mobility 
and state border control have acquired rising political salience in the 
last years. The Paris attacks (13.11.2015), the Cologne assaults 
(01.01.2016) concomitantly with the refugee crisis have contributed 
considerably to the increase of hatred and hostility towards 
immigrants. Immigrants are often accused of being a threat to 
national security, stealing jobs, distorting national identity, 
burdening welfare states and also increasing domestic criminality 
and spreading infectious diseases. In politics, this mind-set is 
causing the rise of the influence of far-right organisations and 
parties with racist ideologies. The Swiss People’s Party, the Progress 
Party in Norway, the Finns Party, The New Flemish Alliance and 
the Sweden Democrats are examples of parties basing their claims 
substantially on anti-immigration rhetoric. The opportunistic ways 
in which the fundamental principle of human equality has been 
undertaken in the public debate brings the discussion on 
immigration and borders back to the core of moral and political 
philosophy as an urgent and actual matter. Considering this, it is of 
great importance to explore the relationship between international 
human mobility and territorial states in order to clarify the points of 




In a relevant sense, these points of conflict emerge from 
tensions between aspirations and attitudes favouring either 
universalism or particularisms. This can take the form of conflicts 
between international law and state sovereignty; state membership 
(liberal and inclusive citizenship linked to domicile) and national 
citizenship (communitarian and exclusive citizenship linked to 
nationality); individual autonomy and group self-determination; 
human rights and domestic law; i.e., these are the conflicts 
generated by the challenges of our contemporary globalized 
societies not fitting to the models of the closed communities of the 
past.  
Universalism and particularisms are constantly pushing and 
polling each other causing enormous friction. This friction is 
responsible for hindering the development of more pluralistic 
modes of political inclusion based on equal participation and equal 
recognition of nationals and foreigners. The emergence of such 
globalized and pluralistic societies is not here simply taken for 
granted as something desirable from an argumentative point of 
view. It is rather considered as a fact, i.e. a product of our time, and 
the desirability of which is very difficult to contest in the liberal 
democratic terms. Human mobility across borders increasing at 
unprecedented rates, is also a fact that follows from our time. This 
means that we currently have to deal with this issue no matter our 
opinions about immigration and borders. It presents the challenges 
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of a changing world of shorter distances and greater 
interconnectedness that, although not without backlashes, seems to 
be here to stay. On the other hand, we have a rigid structure of 
nation-states (nationalism) and states (patriotism) holding on, in 
different degrees, to the remnants of a system still based on national 
citizenship (national identity).  
Certainly, instead of a reconciliatory approach, we could 
theoretically think that one could rather bend for one or the other 
side, but this would, most probably, reveal problematic alternatives 
in political terms: either to embrace the future with no institutional 
backup ready for it or to revert to the twentieth- and nineteenth-
century practices of suppressing the development of pluralistic 
societies. While the former alternative ignores that the promotion 
and protection of pluralism depends on an institutional structure 
appropriately scaled to the problems it faces (today exercised by the 
states), the latter ignores that maybe suppressing the development 
of pluralistic societies is no longer feasible because, as we have 
seen, those who want to or have to migrate will do so no matter 
how dangerous the route or how inhospitable the host is. Based on 
that, a reconciliatory approach using existing institutions for the 
development of pluralistic and inclusive societies presents itself as a 
promising alternative; and it is that balance that I will be searching 
for from this point of my thesis onwards. Despite the fact that I will 
present one proposal towards this direction, I truly believe there is 
MELINA DUARTE 
34 
not only one approach able to fulfil this reconciliatory role. Before I 
introduce my proposal, I will explore some mainstream approaches 
addressing the tensions between freedom of international human 
mobility and territorial states in order to investigate which elements 
of these positions are, from my point of view, important to be kept 
in a reconciliatory thesis. The investigation will be more occupied 
with “learning” from these arguments than “teaching” or trying to 
impose my view on them.  
 
3. Some Previous Responses: From Parochial to Cosmopolitan 
Approaches 
The question of whether it is possible to conciliate freedom of 
international human mobility with territorial states has been 
undertaken by many migration scholars from several disciplines. 
Many of the approaches from the social sciences have been occupied 
with the understanding the causes of migration aiming to describe 
and analyse its process. In political and moral philosophy, the 
debate has been framed as ranging from nationalistic to 
cosmopolitan approaches. These debates can be said to deal more 
with the ideal and real consequences of migration than with its 
causes and the goal is to extract from them a normative value that 
can guide us towards the development of our societies. While 
nationalistic arguments tend to emphasise one or more of the 
following elements:  value of homogeneity (e.g. ethnic, racial, 
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religious, ideological, linguistic), cultural identity, state self-
determination and sovereignty, and domestic economic stability 
over freedom of mobility; cosmopolitan arguments, on the other 
hand, challenge the arbitrariness of such constructions determined 
by one’s place of birth and tend to stress that a greater equality 
among all human beings could be achieved through open borders. 
Of course, not all nationalists endorse strict restrictions on human 
mobility, nor do all cosmopolitans defend open borders. These 
simplified definitions of nationalistic and cosmopolitan theories are 
useful for establishing a common ground to begin the debate, but 
the benefits are limited. They serve to make known the edges of the 
scale. However, to statically polarise the extremes in the name of 
analytical clarity does not help to disclose the most sophisticated 
arguments that usually attempt to balance nationalistic and 
cosmopolitan elements. In this section, I will briefly move towards 
these more sophisticated arguments by highlighting what lies 
between these extremes. This is because the research question 
proposed in this thesis on the reconciliation of the two apparently 
opposing forces requires an arbitrated answer. Thus, I will label the 
arguments individually and try to place them into a continuum 
rather than integrate them in one of these poles. It is important to 
notice that the spectrum is not organised as ranging from less to 
more “mobility”. If this was the case, indeed not only would 
conservative forms of statism perhaps have to be placed before 
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liberal forms of nationalism, altering the order in which I placed the 
purer forms of nationalism and statism, but an even more obvious 
problem would emerge in that this would imply that the economic 
reasons for restricting mobility “allows” more mobility than, for 
example, cultural reasons, which is not the case in this context. 
Instead, the spectrum was meant to be organised according to the 
degree of parochiality, i.e., the degree of provinciality or insularity 
involved in the arguments listed. The higher is the degree of 
parochiality, the more limited or narrow is the outlook or scope of 
the arguments. It is like starting from the smallest concentric circles 
and expanding them to aggregate more integrative forms. This 
follows a similar logic of categorisation as the one used in taxonomy 
to classify species. For example, it starts from an animal such as a 
snow leopard; from there it moves to the category of leopards in 
general that also includes clouded leopards; it then moves to the 
subfamily pantherinae that includes tigers, lions and jaguars; and 
finally ends with the big family felidae that also includes non-
pantherine cats such as domestic cats. Analogically the spectrum 
starts from those arguments that lead to viewing membership in 
terms of it being attached to a very exclusive/narrow group of 
people, moving towards those arguments that view membership in 
more inclusive/broad ways. This being said, the spectrum starts 
from a very parochial version of nationalism that has its roots in 
racial and ethnic grounds and move towards the complete denial of 
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parochiality in the most abstract form of cosmopolitanism. Though 
the arguments next to the poles can be charged with being the most 
radical ones and having no relevant subscribers, this cannot be said 
with respect to those presented under the heading of, for instance, 
“Economic Stability”, “Political Self-Determination, State 
Sovereignty and Jurisdiction” and “Multiple Memberships”. David 
Miller, for example, with his multidimensional approach to issues of 
migration and justice, is represented in more than one place on the 
spectrum because his theory mixes elements of nationalism and 
statism. The list will not be exhaustive, nor will the spectrum 
provide an accurate map of the different arguments, because the 
topic of migration is simply too vast and illustrations like that can 
never be accurate. I am entirely conscious that in order to map the 
arguments with more accuracy I would need to use other types of 
illustrations able to capture more complex and non-sequential types 
of relationships; graphic models such as gephi would probably allow 
for more accuracy. My goal, however, is not to build a cartography 
of arguments. Many important authors and arguments are missing 
from the spectrum. My goal rather consists in offering a brief 
overview of the main issues later analytically discussed in the thesis.   
 
Ethnic and Racial Homogeneity 
According to my judgment, arguments on ethnic and racial 
homogeneity are the closest to the most parochial pole, i.e. they 
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have the most limited or narrow scope when viewing citizenship as 
connected to a small group of people with restricted flexibility for 
expansion. Many of these arguments labelled as ‘white nationalism’ 
are based on racism and on the myth of ethnic supremacy. These 
arguments can be directly dismissed for violating the fundamental 
principle of human equality and dignity. Rather than a rebuttal, they 
reveal a concern and express the need for an enlightened debate on 
the matter. Here, I will discuss a less radical branch of nationalism 
that will be useful for discussions on open borders and welfare 
states directly engaged in the fourth chapter of this thesis, i.e. a 
branch that is not relying on ethnic and racial homogeneity per se, 
but on the symbolic force generated by this type of homogeneity 
within a community. In this branch, Freeman (2013), for example, 
argues that the perceived ethnic and racial heterogeneity negatively 
affects the levels of trust and solidarity within the states to the point 
of hindering the public support for social policies and interfering in 
the regime of the states. He claims that the European Welfare States 
are at risk of being dissolved due to the loss of public support for 
social policies provoked by the increasing number of immigrants 
occupying its territory. He believes that the reason why the US have 
so far been unable to establish more robust welfare schemes can be 
explained through their multi-ethnic and multiracial formation. In 
this sense, international human mobility is said to interfere with the 
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capacity of states to promote trust and collective solidarity within 
their borders and should, therefore, be discouraged.  
Although this type of argument gained significant strength 
after the majority of the voters in the Brexit referendum chose to 
leave the EU in an attempt to regain autonomy over border control, 
the problems with this way of reasoning are, from a philosophical 
point of view, manifold. First, although it is intuitive to think that 
people do not trust strangers, it is counter-intuitive to assume that 
a simple ethnic or racial difference can hinder the building of trust 
through co-existence over time. Of course, some immigrants are 
unreliable persons, but so are some native-born, and this cannot be 
generalised to characterise whole groups as trustworthy or not. 
Second, empirical studies commonly used to support the claim that 
ethnic heterogeneity weakens welfare states’ public support 
conducted by Alesina and Glæser (2004) are now challenged by 
more recent and complete studies (e.g. Mau and Burckhardt 2009). 
These more recent and complete studies do not rely only on social 
spending for measuring trust and solidarity, but also on subjective 
questions on how people feel and think when confronted with 
strangers. They indicate that ethnic heterogeneity might not 
significantly obstruct the support for social policies even when it 
can be verified that immigrants do rely more on welfare benefits 
than natives, as in the case of Denmark. Thus, the reasons for 
preventing freedom of international human mobility grounded on 
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the negative effects on trust and solidarity caused by ethnic and 
racial heterogeneity at the state level are shown to be at least 
debatable and can no longer serve as a basis for justifying exclusion 
without discussion. Third, even if Freeman’s argument does not rely 
on a direct account on ethnicity and race, it can be read as follows: 
because heterogeneity fuels racism, states have to prevent racial and 
ethnic diversity within their territories in order to avoid conflicts 
arising from this mismatch. However, from a philosophical point of 
view that reflects on democratic procedures, if the people, i.e. the 
subjects of a state, confuse ethnicity and race with character at the 
level of prejudice, their majority judgment is not an obvious reason 
for states to rule based on that. Prejudice is a morally condemned 
practice in our societies that can be classified as a case of an 
abandonment of rationality. In “The Right to Ignore the State”, 
Herbert Spencer (1851[2014]:§4), illustrates the problem of 
governments strictly following the public opinion in cases of 
abandonment of rationality. He says:  
 
“Suppose, for the sake of argument, that, struck by some 
Malthusian panic, a legislature duly representing public 
opinion were to enact that all children born during the next ten 
years should be drowned. Does anyone think such an 
enactment would be warrantable? If not, there is evidently a 
limit to the power of a majority.” 
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To avoid the states becoming instruments of irrationality, a smarter 
solution should perhaps consist in clarifying the reasons behind the 
prejudice instead of reinforcing it in societies that are more and 
more pluralistic.  
To conclude, no reconciliation between freedom of 
international human mobility and territorial states is achieved here. 
The point of the argument on ethnic and racial homogeneity is to 
show that this reconciliation is not possible and that uniform 
territorial states and border control should be privileged over 
freedom of international human mobility. The views based on such 
uniformity, however, rely on a model of society that might not 
account for the contemporary changes that globalisation imposes.  
What we can learn from here is that to achieve the 
reconciliation searched for in this thesis, although we should not 
underestimate the destructive potential of public opinion, we 
should neither be so quick when considering some commonsensical 
assumptions on the negative effects of increasing ethnic and racial 
diversity in communities. This is because (1) it is possible that trust 
can be built in ethnically and racially diverse settings; (2) new 
empirical research shows that ethnic and racial diversity are not 
necessarily leading to the loss of public support of welfare policies 
as one once assumed; and (3) even when the majority judgment 
points in one direction, we have philosophical reasons to challenge 




Cultural Identity, Common Language, and Religious Uniformity 
The other branch of nationalist arguments that I want to consider 
here is the one based on cultural identity, common language and 
religious uniformity. This branch is identified as being less parochial 
than the previous one because the elements of ethnic and racial 
homogeneity were replaced by a subtler and more flexible and 
integrative form that is cultural identity, common language and 
religious uniformity. If ethnicity and race are considered more static 
and restrictive features, culture, language and religious can be, in 
principle, changed. Membership would not be viewed as a status for 
the ethnic and racially equals, but for those sharing a common 
culture, language and/or religion. These arguments start with the 
premise that, derived from nations (i.e. people with shared history, 
common culture, same language…), there is, in fact, such a thing as 
a national identity at the state level. There is also the assumption 
that this identity is something worth preserving and that the state 
must respond accordingly. Before we move to a more detailed 
account, it is important to remember that nations and states are not 
the same institutions. If nations were built upon a cultural identity, 
a common language and religious uniformity—and this is also 
contestable—this is certainly not the case with states. In fact, many 
states are multinational. That is the case, for example, in the US, 
Canada, UK, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Russia, China, 
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Brazil, India and Europe, which, in itself, has been referred to as a 
multinational state (Peleg 2007). Second, even if culture is 
something worth being preserved by the states, which I agree with, 
it does not automatically follow that these states must be 
monocultural themselves. As nations and states are not the same 
institutions, neither nations equal to cultural identity. Cultural 
identity may take many other forms than the form of national 
identity. This means that arguments of this branch have to address 
the large gap between cultural identity and state unity and this is 
done through the defence of the significance of the idea of national 
identity. 
David Miller (e.g. 2008; 2002), who perhaps presents the 
most prominent account on this branch, recognises the difference 
between states as political unities and nations as ethical ones, but 
argues for the co-extension of both in the building of nation-states. 
The distinction between national identity and cultural identity 
seem, however, to be very much blurred. The assumption behind 
that argument rests upon the social function of shared public 
identity formed over time. Individuals with a shared identity are 
said to be more prone to sacrifice themselves for helping the group. 
This cohesion achieved at the level of the nation due to culture 
distinctiveness would have implications affecting the functioning of 
the states. Social cohesion and social cooperation are then the 
reasons for arguing for the co-extension of nations and states. Since 
MELINA DUARTE 
44 
nationhood is dependent on cultural identity, for the states to 
function well, they must preserve their cultural distinctiveness. 
Immigration would disrupt cultural identity and thereby break 
social cohesion, schemes of cooperation and welfare programs. The 
result would be the discomfort of nations and the unstable 
functioning of states. In order to avoid these negative effects, it is 
argued that international immigration should be restricted so long 
as it reflects the wish of the people to protect their identity and to 
maintain the way they organise their societies.  
This argument has been criticised for not offering a strong 
support for border control. This is because as long as immigrants 
are not culturally different, they would not disturb social cohesion 
and thus, there would be no reason to restrict their mobility and 
membership. This means that, on the basis of this, Miller would 
have to accept that states would not be able to restrict the mobility 
and membership of culturally similar immigrants. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that cultural distinctiveness is already strongly 
affected by globalisation and increasing interconnectedness. 
Considering this, it is difficult to say how immigration would 
worsen the situation if immigrants are also subjected to the effects 
of globalisation wherever they are. Other critics question how 
different cultures would need to be in order to impede assimilation 
at a suitable level for creating social cohesion and cooperation. 
Common markets might well today have the effect of creating 
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spaces of social cohesion and cooperation in spite of culture 
differences. But this is not all. It can also be said that Miller’s 
argument relies on a romanticised conception of the nation that 
overlooks the role of immigration in its historical formation, 
creating a false impression of homogeneity in contemporary nations, 
which does not correspond to the contemporary state ideal. This 
romanticised conception of nation also creates the illusion that the 
only meaningful connection among individuals able to foster social 
cohesion and cooperation occur at the national level and that this 
occurs rather “naturally”. But once we agree that national identity is 
constructed, the same pedagogical means used to create the idea of 
nation in the past could well be used to foster attachments to larger 
levels of belonging. If it is difficult to accept that national identity is 
constructed, which I do not think it is, we can minimally agree that, 
even if this is the case, just because something happens “naturally” 
this does not mean that it is static and it does not evolve with time. 
The conflicts that this restrictive role of national identity is 
provoking today show, as we saw earlier, the need of our times for 
larger spaces of social cohesion and cooperation than the past.  
Another important problem that I see with this argument is 
that it mixes up multiple levels of political membership and expects 
to apply justifiable claims at a particular level to a more general one; 
it is like trying to fit the big Russian doll inside a smaller one 
instead of the other way around. As a result, on the urge of 
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promoting cultural distinctiveness, these approaches end up 
oppressing minority groups that might be too weak and small to be 
considered a nation and that do not seek political autonomy within 
a territory, but rather, recognition. On this basis, we see that 
cultural arguments are relevant and should be taken into account 
when considering bordering processes at multiple levels. However, 
as it will be argued in chapter three, national identity should not be 
seen as a necessary criterion for granting immigrants the right to 
settle and become full members of the state where they reside.  
In conclusion, these arguments on national identity do not 
attempt to reconcile international human mobility with territorial 
states, but aim to show that this reconciliation, as a matter of 
justice to the defined groups, should not be pursued. What we can 
learn from it is that cultural identity still plays an important role in 
forming communities and ought to be preserved for this reason. 
This does not mean, however, that cultural identity should be 
preserved when nurturing exclusion and blocking the emergence of 
larger circles of belonging where these identities can co-exist and 
flourish together.  
 
Multicultural co-existence 
Another branch of liberal nationalism that deserves our attention 
here is the one that, although assuming that national identity does 
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matter as an expression of one’s cultural identity, questions how this 
identity should matter in order to be compatible with our 
multicultural and pluralistic societies. The most known proponent 
of this branch can be said to be Will Kymlicka in the thesis 
defended in “Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal 
multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism” (2015). This branch is 
here considered as being less parochial than Miller’s liberal 
nationalism because cultural distinctiveness is not used as a reason 
grounding exclusion, but multicultural co-existence. In this article, 
Kymlicka aims at reconciling national solidarity with support for 
immigration and multiculturalism. In order to identify the prospects 
for reconciliation, he contrasts two radically opposed views, the 
neoliberal model of multiculturalism that privileges mobility and 
diversity over national solidarity and the welfare chauvinism that 
privileges national solidarity over mobility and diversity. He draws 
attention to the fact that national solidarity does not only have a 
regressive side with the purpose of excluding immigrants, but also a 
progressive political side when aligned with liberal nationalism. As 
a progressive political project, nationhood can contribute to, among 
other things, securing democracy, and establishing and maintaining 
a welfare system. But in order this not to provoke segregation and 
exclusion of immigrants, liberal nationalism must, according to 
him, be supplemented and constrained by multiculturalism 
(Kymlicka 2001). The challenge is to make this supplement not 
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weaken the positive effects of nationhood. Kymlicka’s strategy in 
responding to this challenge is to show that historically 
multiculturalism emerged within the social democratic project. Only 
later, it was transformed into a neoliberal tool in favour of market 
inclusion irrespective of citizenship provoking a welfare chauvinistic 
reaction. The key is, he says, to explore these older roots and 
develop a multiculturalism following the Canadian model of 
“nation-building”, i.e. a model that “enables immigrants to express 
their culture and identity as modes of participating and contributing 
to the national society” (Kymlicka 2015)2.  
 This view is criticized for idealising the conditions of the past 
and neglecting the strength of the contemporary transformations 
towards internationalisation. Bauböck (2016) 3  argues that a 
multicultural liberal nationalism does not resolve the conflicts 
between nationalism and contemporary democracy regarding 
territory and membership. While nationalism relies on the idea of 
group self-determination, a separate territory and exclusive 
membership, democracy today has the potential of binding together 
                                         
2 The open access electronic version contains no pagination. The paper can be 
accessed here (last accessed July 2016): 
http://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-
015-0017-4 
3 The open access electronic version contains no pagination. The paper can be 
accessed here (last accessed July 2016): 
http://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-
016-0031-1 
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different territorial units that share overlapping memberships. To 
Bauböck, a balance could be struck when “individuals regard 
themselves as multiple citizens across all levels of the polity and 
accept that those who move across borders are transnational 
citizens who belong simultaneously to territorially distinct polities”. 
This would imply in dropping nationality as a criterion for the 
access to political membership.  
To sum up, Kymlicka’s attempt to reconcile immigration and 
territorial states fails because of the insistence on keeping actual 
configurations of the past. Although Kymlicka is right when he says 
that nationhood still matters nowadays, he does not seem to realise 
that this might be part of the problem, not of the solution. To 
continue to determine political membership in a globalised world 
within the limited scope of nationhood will only exacerbate cultural 
conflicts. Multicultural co-existence becomes then an arena of 
combat. What we can learn from here is that even if nationality still 
matters today as a remnant of other times and even though people 
should be free to identify themselves in the ways they wish, these 
forms of identification should not matter for determining state 




Political Self-Determination, State Sovereignty and Jurisdiction 
Moving forward in the spectrum according to the level of 
parochiality, we find positions that attempt to justify border control 
by replacing the significance of nationhood and cultural 
distinctiveness for political self-determination and state sovereignty. 
They are not necessarily more open or closed to human mobility 
across borders than the previous accounts (all defend the state’s 
right to exclude immigrants), but the reasons grounding it are less 
provincial in the sense that they appeal to a political framework 
using the neutral vocabulary of rights. Michael Walzer’s (2008) 
account provides one of the most well-known examples of such 
positions and David Miller (2012) and Michael Blake (2013) some 
of the most recent ones. To Walzer, state membership is a social 
construction. Relying on a built commonality, the members who 
created this construction in the first place have the right to limit and 
distribute membership to strangers according to their conditions. 
The questions that arise from that, though limited by certain moral 
constraints, are merely related to how this distribution of 
membership should be done, which sort of strangers would be 
entitled to it, and what should the admission policies of the states 
be on the matter. But the questions do not go as far as disputing 
who should determine membership. Blake questions it, but this 
issue is, for Walzer, settled. Derived from previous social binding 
around the rules the people imposed on themselves, the 
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distribution of membership is a decision of the state members. 
Immigration control then emerges as a claim for the states’ right to 
self-determination on which depends the exercise of their 
sovereignty. Sovereign states are seen, by definition, as having the 
legitimate right to exclude immigrants from their territories. In this 
context, state membership is clearly the states’ choice. But this is 
not primarily because this choice corroborates the fulfilling of 
national interests, but because it reveals the deepest meaning of the 
collective self-determination for its members. In these terms, the 
states’ right to political self-determination is raised as a moral right 
and as such, is related to the promotion and protection of human 
rights of the state members.  
In Walzer’s account, the nature of state membership is 
disclosed by comparison with more simple forms of memberships 
such as neighbourhoods, clubs, and families. Neighbourhoods have 
free admission. Residents might not like the newcomers, but they 
cannot prevent them from moving in. Because of this incapacity of 
controlling membership that reveals a lack of power to self-
determination, Walzer argues that states should not engage in the 
same loose form of membership that neighbourhoods do. The 
reason behind this is that the same discontentment provoked by the 
moving in of unwanted newcomers would be magnified at the state 
level. The consequence of this discontentment at a large scale would 
be the unintended closure of the smaller communities, resulting in 
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a state formed by a bunch of small ‘fortresses’. To him, states are 
better compared with clubs and families rather than 
neighbourhoods. Like clubs, they are said to have the right to settle 
their own admission criteria. And like families, they are said to rely 
on mutuality and obligation, authority and obedience. The only 
difference is that states, being liberal democracies, are morally 
constrained to admit certain kinds of newcomers such as refugees 
and asylum seekers.  
This argument can be contested on various fronts. The main 
objection that can be listed is the rebuttal of its initial premise that 
says that state members should have the right to determine state 
membership. One way of attacking this premise is to challenge the 
scope of the right to self-determination. It can be argued that even if 
state members should have the right to self-determination, it does 
not necessarily follow that they can limit the right to the self-
determination of others. When restricting mobility across their 
borders, state members are determining not only their fate, but also 
the fate of other persons. Those excluded persons are affected by 
rules they did not even have the chance to help shape—a violation 
of popular sovereignty that, according to Arash Abizadeh (2008), 
illegitimately coerces people. Abizadeh reminds us that, as it is in 
the essence of the democratic thought, to be legitimate, coercion 
should be democratically justified by everyone subjected to it. A key 
point to be mentioned here is that self-determination is understood 
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primarily as an individual right shared by every human being, 
irrespective of whether they are natives or immigrants. From this 
perspective, it is not a right that can be transferred to groups, co-
nationals, compatriots or entities as such. Thus, as state members, 
non-members also have a right to determine themselves, and the 
self-determination of state members does not justify the right to 
unilateral exclusion, as will be discussed in the second chapter of 
this thesis. 
Another way to attack Walzer’s initial premise has to do with 
the qualifications for membership. When comparing states with 
neighbourhoods, clubs, and families, Walzer captures something 
inherently right about the constitution and classification of different 
types of memberships. He shows that we engage differently and for 
different reasons while participating in different kinds of collectives. 
However, as will be discussed more closely in chapter three of this 
thesis, club and state membership are not analogous to the case of 
liberal democratic states as he argues. This is because the 
consistency to universal moral values to which liberal democratic 
states are committed compel them to conceive a more inclusive 
form of membership at the state level than the ones engaged by 
particular groups. Group members might have a right to exclude. If 
they do, this is because this kind of membership seems to be 
dependent on the fulfilment of some conditions and on the external 
attestation of the group members. For example, to be a member of 
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the traditional Freemasonry, one has to be an affluent man, believe 
in the brotherhood of man, intend to regularly attend the 
ceremonies in one of the assigned lodges, and so on. Besides the 
fulfilment of these conditions cited above, the aspirant member 
must be invited by the brotherhood of man and the recognition of 
his membership must be progressively attested by several rituals of 
initiation. However, state membership in liberal democracies cannot 
actually be comparable to group membership in these terms. While 
it seems permitted for groups to rely on some kind of homogeneity 
expressed by the required conditions for membership, liberal 
democratic states have to expand their scope according to the values 
they stand for. In such a context, as liberal democratic states have a 
commitment to equality and freedom and the aspiration of asserting 
tolerance as a fundamental value and englobing pluralism, their task 
differ largely from the task of particular groups. Instead of 
promoting one particular set of values, the task of these states 
should be to manage the plurality of values of particular groups, 
sometimes conflicting, that coexist in their territories. A condition 
that seems to be coherent to impose for state membership in these 
terms is residency in the states’ territory as a sign of willingness to 
participate in the life of the states. This residency, however, should 
not need to be pre-approved by the state members. This is because 
the states, being the managers of pluralism, cannot intend to 
directly avoid the discontentment provoked by the encounter with 
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the otherness, but rather, to administrate it in the best way 
possible.  
Related to state sovereignty, there is another important 
argument supporting the restriction of international human 
mobility that I want to contest here. That is the argument on 
territorial rights recently defended by David Miller (2012), among 
others. As will be discussed in chapter two, according to this view, 
state sovereignty is defined as being essentially composed of 
territorial rights, being the right to jurisdiction and the right to 
control the movement of persons across borders among them. 
International freedom of mobility would, in this sense, inflict a loss 
of sovereignty to the states and should therefore be avoided. The 
problem with this argument is that the right to exclude is presented 
as being parasitic to the right to jurisdiction. As the right to 
jurisdiction equals state sovereignty, it looks like it is impossible to 
deny the right to exclude without compromising the whole 
institution of the state. However, this parasitic relationship is 
questionable today with the rise of new forms of understanding 
sovereignty driven by the increasing influence of supranational and 
global structures. Thus, rather than showing the need to control the 
borders, this argument brings to light the need to update the 
territorial rights of internationalised liberal democratic states.  
Blake (2013) presents a subtler version of these two arguments 
in the sense that he questions what Walzer takes for granted, 
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namely the state’s right to exclude immigrants, and relies on a less 
demanding conception of state than Miller does, which does not 
appeal to a strong meaning of sovereignty or group self-
determination. Following Abizadeh’s condition (2008), Blake 
concedes that the right to exclude immigrants is a coercive right 
that must be justified by respecting the moral equality of all. As 
opposed to Abizadeh (2008) and also Carens (2008) and Cole 
(2000), he argues that such a justification is possible within the 
liberal egalitarian framework, derived from a conception of state 
based on territorial and legal unity marking the state’s jurisdiction. 
Evoking the article IX of the Montevideo Convention (1933), he 
connects to jurisdiction the state’s obligation to protect everybody 
within this space that constitutes a jurisdiction, being them 
nationals or immigrants. Such an obligation would impose some 
restrictions to the freedom of the current inhabitants that would 
have to extend protection to the newcomers. The imposition of the 
extension of protection to newcomers appears then as a violation of 
freedom of the current inhabitants. This is because while current 
inhabitants of a certain jurisdiction have obligations not to violate 
the rights of persons outside their jurisdiction, they only have 
obligations to protect the rights of those within such a jurisdiction. 
This means that newcomers, coming from a stable state, are already 
protected in their original jurisdiction. They can choose to deny it 
and seek protection at another jurisdiction. Current inhabitants are, 
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in this context, not obliged to accommodate the preferences of 
those newcomers that already enjoyed protection before moving. 
Such newcomers would not have the right to impose their choices 
of getting a new protector without the consent of the current 
inhabitants.  Thus, in order to avoid such a violation of their 
freedom, current inhabitants would acquire the right to exclude 
immigrants. The right to exclude is then presented as a question of 
freedom of choice to the current inhabitants, i.e. a right to have a 
say and accept or not to extend the protection to others. This right 
to exclude is, however, limited by certain conditions in ways strong 
enough to make the current practices on border control 
condemnable. Immigrants that do not enjoy of protection in their 
states of origin, for example, would fall into one of the limiting 
conditions.  
One problem with Blake’s argument is that, although it 
questions the state’s right to exclude immigrants and it does not 
appeal to a strong meaning of sovereignty and group self-
determination based on ethnicity, culture distinctiveness or shared 
interests, it still defines the states in an excessively rigid way. States 
are defined as closed territorial and legal units; downplaying the 
emergence of multiple and overlapping political communities in 
larger levels and undermining the significance of freedom of choice 
for immigrants in such a context.  
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As in the previous accounts discussed above, the restrictive 
role of the state is still taken for granted and a reconciliation 
between international human mobility and territorial states is still 
seen as unworkable; specifically, for disrupting the right to group 
self-determination of the state members, being incompatible with 
state sovereignty in itself or violating the freedom of current 
inhabitants. What we can learn from it is that in order to achieve 
the reconciliation that we search for in this thesis, we need to 
rethink the role of the state as a more dynamic institution capable of 
responding adequately to the challenges of increasing 
internationalisation. In order to do this, the state’s territorial rights 
and the meaning of territory itself must be contested; and this is 
done in the second chapter of this thesis.  
 
Economic Stability 
Less parochial arguments than the previous ones are the ones 
attempting to justify border control based on economic reasons and 
not relying on any particular account privileging either natives or 
immigrants. Though economic reasons are still restrictive in the 
sense that it creates a divide between rich and poor that it is not 
easy to overcome, one wants to believe that the market has an 
integrative power since money is money no matter to whom it 
belongs. In this connection it is important to note that the 
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objections to freedom of international human mobility are 
mathematical and rest on the assumption that there are a limited 
number of persons that a state can accommodate. Jobs, housing, 
and welfare benefits are, for example, limited, and an overload of 
people, especially those who’s need of assistance is greater than 
their contributions, would provoke domestic economic instability. 
Such instability would then make everybody, natives, resident aliens 
and some newcomers alike, worse-off. In this context, borders 
should not be strictly closed, but admission policies should take 
these limitations into account.  
The economist Martin Ruhs (see 2013), for example, 
subscribes to this position. He defends the position that states, as 
institutions responsible for providing for the people within its 
jurisdiction, should act in the best interest of their citizens and 
residents and that admission policies should be rationally designed 
according to that goal. This gives the states the right to select the 
type of immigrants that should be admitted (e.g., skilled or 
unskilled workers, according to the dynamics of labour shortages), 
the number of immigrants, and also the allocation of rights offered 
to the different categories of immigrants. This argument is very 
compelling from the state governments’ point of view because it 
provides guidance for safe policies, but the argument is limited to 
labour migration and can be refuted in various ways. Some of these 
counter-arguments will be developed in the fourth chapter of this 
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thesis, but here, I would like to briefly mention that even if free 
international mobility would possibly inflict some harm to the 
domestic economy of some states in particular, there is strong 
evidence showing that globally, under certain circumstances, the 
effects would be overall positive. In a global perspective, migration 
can be seen as part of the developmental process of our unequal 
societies moving towards equilibrium. Economically, this 
equilibrium would be led by the optimisation of production factors 
and by the international wage convergence. Border control could 
then be refuted by the libertarian and utilitarian arguments on 
mobility of human capital as argued by, for example, Milton 
Friedman (see 1978). In my view, however, the success of this 
equilibrium, different from the libertarian argument, depends on a 
clear distinction between freedom of mobility of workers and the 
weakening of the labour laws and welfare policies that protect them, 
as will be discussed in the fourth paper. But, considering the 
economic arguments in favour of border control in the name of 
economic stability, the reconciliation that we search for is here seen 
as possible, but non-desirable, considering the role given to the 
states to preferably protect their citizens and residents over others 
and resist globalisation. What we can learn from this objection is 
that the process towards globalisation is not exactly smooth sailing. 
Some workers, e.g. those living outside big centres have their skills 
made dispensable by technology or their labour laws weakened by 
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international competition, will inevitably suffer some negative 
consequences. This means that even though globally most people 
would benefit economically from freedom of mobility and 
membership, some people would be made worse-off; an outcome 
insensitive to a Pareto-optimal solution. In the chapter four, I argue 
that these negative consequences should be addressed (prevented or 
repaired) by stronger welfare policies.   
 
Multiple Memberships 
Reaching the range of the more cosmopolitan arguments, the 
common assumption is that all human beings belong to the same 
community. As this is a rather vague formulation, it is not a 
surprise that it is interpreted in many ways. The first division that 
can be made is between its literal and metaphorical interpretation. 
The literal interpretation derives the right to freedom of mobility 
directly from our common belonging to the world, or, in other 
words, from the radical denial of our particular forms of belonging 
as shielding mobility. Due to its radical approach, this view, as you 
can imagine, is placed at the cosmopolitan pole of the scale and will 
be discussed later. Here, I will consider the metaphoric and subtler 
approaches placed in the middle of the cosmopolitan side of the 
continuum. This is because these approaches will introduce the 
most fruitful possibilities for a conciliation between free 
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international human mobility and territorial states as examined in 
this thesis.  
These views are influenced by the so-called positive 
cosmopolitanism originated by the Stoics. Greek and Roman Stoics 
had different approaches to the question, but what can be 
generalised for our purpose here is that for both of the schools, our 
common belonging to the cosmos did not entail the rejection of 
other forms of membership, such as the membership in the polis. 
This possibility to concomitantly engage in multiple memberships 
emerged from their moral philosophy. Based on the idea of virtue, 
the virtuous person was able to transcend parochialisms and to 
connect with the whole of humanity. Membership in parochial 
communities were, for the virtuous person, not conflicting with the 
membership in the cosmos. The borders dividing one community 
from another were interactive and dynamically understood. It 
expressed the current idea that even if we belong to a particular 
community, we also belong to humanity and are connected to those 
who are not our compatriots or co-nationals, for instance. This 
connection to the whole of humanity generated a moral obligation 
to recognise every human being as equal, irrespective of nationality. 
Today, no sound theory disagrees with it. As Gillian Brock (2013) 
remarks, this view is not distinctive to cosmopolitans anymore. The 
deeper disagreements arise when questioning the political 
implications that such commitment towards humanity generates. 
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Kant (2000), as will be discussed more closely in the first 
chapter of this thesis, argued that our belonging to humanity gives 
rise to the right to hospitality, which means the right every 
individual has to not be treated with hostility when peacefully 
visiting a foreigner country. This right was introduced by Kant as 
part of the foundation of the cosmopolitan law. As opposed to the 
existing international law, the cosmopolitan law was meant to 
regulate not the relationship among states, but the relationship 
between states and foreign individuals. One consequence of the 
right to hospitality was the limitation of the states’ power over 
foreigners, which led to the need for rethinking the meaning of 
sovereignty. Through these lenses, sovereignty was not only seen 
from the domestic perspective, but had to be expanded to the 
international level as part of the movement towards a cosmopolitan 
constitution. The right to hospitality, however, also imposed some 
limitations to the claims of foreigners. What was protected under 
this right was the opportunity to visit a foreign country, but 
outsiders could not claim residency or citizenship based on that 
right. State membership was part of another deal, called the contract 
of beneficence. Consequently, for Kant, settlement remained a 
discretionary right of states.  
Criticising this limitation of the right to hospitality, Seyla 
Benhabib (2004) proposed to expand the Kantian idea of 
cosmopolitan law. She wanted to ground state membership on a 
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moral as well as a legal right instead of on a contract of beneficence. 
To her, our belonging to humanity commits us to recognise that 
individuals, in Hannah Arendt’s terms, have the ‘right to have 
rights’ (Benhabib 2004: 49-69). According to Benhabib, although 
the right to hospitality progressed towards the achievement of this 
idea, it was still restricted to rules of sociability and did not respond 
to the needs of establishing political inclusion as a right. As in the 
case of Kant, Benhabib’s proposal also brought some advancements 
and accepted some limitations to both states and foreign 
individuals. In her view, states should be obliged (indeed, punished, 
if violating it) to settle transparent, consistent and non-
discriminatory conditions for the acquisition of state membership. 
Foreigners, on the other hand, would have to observe and fulfil 
these conditions in order to be eligible for state membership.  
The problem with Benhabib’s approach, as we are going to see 
more closely in the first chapter, is that in the urge of reconciling 
international human mobility and territorial states, the 
advancements were too modest when reverted to immigration 
policies. The states’ right to exclude was not challenged at a 
significant level and, despite the tensions it produces, states kept 
the discretionary right over immigration control. More specifically, 
in such an approach, states were allowed to remain the institutions 
deciding the conditions of eligibility for state membership. As we 
know, these conditions can be pretty arbitrary without necessarily 
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being characterised as obscure, inconsistent or discriminatory. This 
is the case of the ‘good character’ criterion currently used in the UK 
or the restrictive condition based on the right of blood still 
particularly important in Germany. Such problematic conditions are 
seen as an expression of the states’ right to decide the requirements 
for the acquisition of state membership. The margins of what is 
acceptable as just conditions for state membership are not clear or 
are too demanding. Once the aspiring members meet the 
requirements, the states would have the duty to grant them 
membership. But as the requirements are still decided by the states 
with a lot of room for interpretation, the right to membership 
seems to be very close to the old contract of beneficence. When 
keeping the states’ right to exclude, Benhabib concedes too much 
and ends up weakening the legal meaning of the right to 
membership. As it stands, the claim for the right to membership is 
too general and its defence equals the claim for the right to a 
nationality that is already an acknowledged human right. The 
meaning of domestic sovereignty is not reinvented or transformed; 
it is just negotiated. The problem with that is that it ignores the 
transformations that have already taken place in the meaning of 
sovereignty. As David Held (2010) shows, the space between 
domestic law and international law is already being filled with a 
cosmopolitan law that aims to protect and promote the rights of 
every individual. Institutions like the United Nations, the European 
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Union, The European Court of Human Rights, The International 
Criminal Court and several multilateral agreements between and 
among states have already changed the meaning of state sovereignty 
in many ways.  So, instead of trying to preserve elements of the 
classic concept of sovereignty, the efforts should, in line with 
Habermas’ thought (2008), be directed to explore new ways in 
which to adapt national sovereignty to the emerging forms of 
governance beyond the state level. What should be brought to the 
front, then, are discussions on ways of surpassing old internal or 
domestic conceptions of sovereignty still based on the right to 
protection against foreigner domination, towards an external and 
international one based on states’ ability to cooperate. Thus, it 
seems that the possibility of a reconciliation between international 
human mobility and territorial states might lie in the development 
of a stronger conception of external sovereignty.  Considering this, 
we see that in Benhabib’s approach, this reconciliation is 
compromised due to its excessively state-centric character, still 
based on the protection of an internal view of sovereignty.  
The reason behind this cautious advancement of the right to 
membership was the belief that political membership necessarily 
entails exclusion. Although Benhabib advocates for porous borders, 
she concedes to the states the right to exclude in order to enable the 
functioning and accountability of democracy.  In my view, however, 
as it will be argued in the first and second chapters of this thesis, it 
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is not because political membership necessarily entails exclusion 
that this exclusion needs to be done unilaterally by the states. Self-
exclusion might also be possible when state membership is 
understood as a question of individual choice.  
  
World Citizenship 
Reaching the opposing edge of the spectrum and contrasting the 
most parochial arguments, we find the so-called negative 
cosmopolitanism. This view can be illustrated by the fascinating 
figure of Diogenes of Sinope: the cynic, the beggar, the vagrant, and 
the ostracised criminal. Diogenes is portrayed in Raphael’s fresco, 
The School of Athens, sitting in the middle of the stairs of the open 
Agora in a very loose and carefree position. His head is on Plato’s 
side and his feet, on Aristotle’s side. In the fresco, he is clearly 
provoking some uneasy reactions from people around him. One 
person in the Agora is perplexed, pointing to him with both hands 
facing upwards and expressing their puzzlement to somebody else 
towards whom his/her face is directed. A part from Heraclitus, 
Diogenes is the only one portrayed alone. He is shown as being 
rootless and isolated. When asked where he came from, Diogenes 
replied that he was a citizen of the world. What he meant by that 
was not accepting any allegiance to his fatherland or to any other 
place as a defined territory with recognised authority. This 
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illustration is mind-blowing. But the obvious problem with this 
view of world citizenship is its anarchic consequences. Thus, even if 
this conception of cosmopolitanism does offer support for the case 
of open borders by drastically rejecting the meaning of membership, 
this support is not strong because it compromises the rise of the 
political. What can be brought to the forefront from this account 
today is a critical view of the arbitrariness of national citizenship 
when relying strongly on one’s place of birth as the main focus of 
allegiance. Gerard Delanty, for example, describes this contribution 
of negative cosmopolitanism as being twofold: “an act of individual 
freedom and a recognition of the external category of the world” 
(2009:21).  
This detached understanding of belonging influenced the later 
development of other forms of cosmopolitanism and it is taken very 
seriously by, for example, luck egalitarian perspectives on borders 
such as the one advanced, though not reduced to, by Joseph Carens 
(2013). The simple accidental fact of being born, for example, in 
Norway or in Angola has profound impacts on one’s life’s prospects. 
The impacts are so significant that they can mean a 30-year gap in 
life expectancy, a huge difference in income per capita, abysmal 
differences in educational and career opportunities, and so on. 
Citizenship, in this sense, is comparable to a valuable inheritance 
that cultivates deep and unjust inequalities. One way of overcoming 
these injustices, then, is to enable the mobility of persons across 
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borders. The problem with the luck egalitarian account when used 
to defend open borders, however, is that freedom of mobility is not 
the only way of overcoming these injustices and, according to Pogge 
(2010:114-133), not even the most effective one. What is required 
to overcome injustices are compensations. And compensations can 
actually be done in other ways than allowing mobility. International 
aid and cash transfers are obvious ways of compensating for 
structural inequalities. This means that, from this perspective, 
developed countries could still keep their borders closed if they used 
other schemes of solidarity. Furthermore, a different obligation 
would affect developing and low-income countries. Deriving from 
this argument, latter countries would not have the need to allow 
immigration because they are seen as not being the ones promoting 
such injustices. In this sense, it seems that their duty would be 
restricted to letting their people emigrate to more developed 
countries.  
Another problem is that even if we admit that enabling 
mobility of persons would be one of the important ways of 
overcoming inequalities, this argument does not actually support 
the thesis on open borders when confronted with circumstantial 
objections. This is because global inequalities could also be used to 
show that, in practice, open borders would overstretch developed 
countries due to the arrival of more immigrants that they can 
actually support. At the same time, open borders would deprive 
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developing and low-income countries of an important labour force. 
In this sense, open borders would then be possible only after having 
achieved a more equal world.  
Carens’ position faces this problem. He admits that the 
implementation of open borders is dependent on the reduction of 
inequalities among states (2013:280). But then, if open borders 
already sound to some like a utopian idea, what is to be said about 
relying on a, perhaps, even more utopian idea because its 
implementation is said to depend on the previous achievement of a 
more equal world? In my view, a more promising egalitarian 
argument on open borders should reverse this argument. In order to 
do that, we have to evaluate how utopian open borders really are. 
First, we must remember that state borders are political 
constructions. They are currently the central ways in which 
distribution schemes are organised, but in different times and 
different conditions, these schemes were organised in different 
ways: in empires, city-states, villages, tribes, and so on. So, to 
change the centrality of the role of states is possible and not utopic 
in this sense. Second, with globalisation, times and conditions are 
changing. The increasing interconnectedness is imposing demands 
on the development of supranational structures and pressing states 
to allow more mobility of persons across their borders. This means 
that a change of centrality of the role of states in controlling their 
borders is today also likely and not utopian in this sense either. 
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Keeping in mind that open borders might not be a distant ideal 
anymore, as we might have wanted to imagine from our cocooned 
perspectives, opening the borders before having a more equal world 
could lead to a more equal world instead of being dependent of it. 
Open borders would, from this perspective, serve as a strong and 
real incentive for high-income countries to distribute resources in 
order to create similar life conditions and opportunities abroad and 
avoid the risk of being overwhelmed by immigration. 
Although these arguments and counter-arguments on 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism press to some advancement towards 
justice for individuals, it is still important not to reduce 
international freedom of mobility to a question of distribution. 
Virtually, the defence of many fundamental rights can rouse queries 
on distributive justice, but some are not limited to that. The right to 
freedom of speech is, for example, engaged in such a debate on 
distribution when it is argued that the owner of a TV Channel can 
exercise it more than a househusband. But the right to freedom of 
speech is itself not a mere claim for distribution of resources or 
opportunities, but a claim for individual freedom. Analogically, 
equality of opportunities enrolled in the claim for free international 
human mobility is not a claim that justifies migration from poor to 
rich countries. The question of human mobility is much broader 
than that. It includes the poor and the rich, nationals and foreigners, 
as human beings of equal standing, holders of individual rights, who 
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can create and transform their lives. Thus, what we can learn from it 
is that the needy might have a claim for mobility, but not because 
they are needy, but because they are human beings of equal 
standing.  
  
4. My Response: State Membership as a Question of Individual Choice 
From the arguments discussed in the previous section, we could see 
that the reconciliation between the increasing international human 
mobility and territorial states was either considered impossible, 
non-desirable, unworkable or the attempts to reconcile them were 
unable to respond adequately to our current challenges in a 
globalised world. The problem was not that they were pending more 
for one or another side because reconciliation does not necessarily 
require an equal or proportional compromise by all the involved 
parties. It is not because one loses something that the other party 
has to lose something of same or similar value in order to enable 
the reconciliation. We are not talking about restauration of justice, 
which demands some kind of proportional reparation for the 
previous losses. It is actually compatible with reconciliation that 
sometimes one of the parties has to accept to lose something in 
order not to lose everything. Rather than reparation, reconciliation 
involves a certain acquiescence in something undesirable that one 
no longer opposes: e.g. I reconcile myself to my limited cognitive 
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capacity and decide to do the best I can with my ape-like brain; I 
reconcile myself to the fact that I will have no summer holidays this 
year and decide to rebound to my lovely job. 
In personal relationships, for example, a sphere where 
reconciliations are very common: after the bounds are broken due to 
the misconduct of one of the parties towards the partner, a 
reconciliation between both does not entail that the affected partner 
have the right to equally misbehave in order to re-stablish the 
relationship. Though this can sound fair from one perspective, the 
result will probably be even more damaging for the relationship in 
itself. The success of their reconciliation seems to depend more on 
their capacity of accepting the changes provoked by the conflict and 
of reframing their new roles in the relationship. In this sense, 
reconciliation seems to demand only that the bond between the 
parties is renewed and remains, for all purposes, solid.  
This can be also seen in a different setting than personal 
relationships, such as in socio-economic relationships. Think about 
the conflict between large companies and small shops generated by 
capitalism. The conflict is generated when large companies threaten 
the existence of small shops because they are able to charm the 
customers by offering them better services and more diversity of 
products at lower prices. Owners and sympathisers of small local 
businesses might want to fight out the large companies, but in 
reality, because of the increasing demands of the global market, it is 
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hard to believe that they stand a chance. I would not, at least, bet on 
that being the case. Their production might be too small; their 
products too expensive; distribution too restricted; and the 
consumption of their products appears to be decreasing. On the 
other hand, large companies might want to smash the competition 
of the small businesses as soon as possible in order to increase their 
profits, but in doing so they would lose important local knowledge 
and personal contact that would actually help them grow. Certainly 
these parties are not both in the same bargaining position and they 
would probably not end up with an exactly proportional deal. A 
reconciliation would most likely only create a link of 
interdependence between both parts that would be able to secure 
their co-existence. This could be achieved if, for example, instead of 
smashing the small businesses, large companies embraced them. It 
is like a large company buying milk from several small farmers to 
brand them together and distribute it at large, instead of producing 
the milk itself and breaking down the small farmers. They reconcile 
themselves in order to enable their co-existence and when they do, 
even if some party apparently lost more than the other in relation to 
the past, the new bond of interdependence will promote the 
flourishing of them both in the future.  
 It is this kind of reconciliation between the increasing 
international human mobility and territorial states that I am 
proposing here: a reconciliation that is attentive to the current 
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challenges and that will renew and secure the bond between the 
parties for the future. The proposal consists in arguing that mobility 
and membership at the state level should and can become a 
question of individual choice. Such a proposal is attentive to the 
current challenges because the individual freedom of mobility and 
membership will fulfil with content the space between domestic and 
international law that is already being filled formally with a 
cosmopolitan law that aims at protecting and promoting rights and 
freedoms equally to every individual irrespective of place of birth. At 
the same time, it creates the conditions to renew and secure the 
bond between all parties. This in the sense that the individual 
choice in this connection has the capacity to reshape territorial 
rights of sovereign states so that they are not dependent on the 
unilateral right to exclude immigrants without demanding sovereign 
states to cease to exist. In fact, considering state membership as a 
matter of individual choice would, in this sense, strength rather 
than weaken sovereignty if this latter is conceptualized in terms of 
the states’ capacity to create a system for individual self-
development. This is because, sovereignty would then be asserted 
by the recognition of the states’ capacity to attempt to provide the 
conditions for human flourishing to whomever resides under their 
jurisdictions and not by the states’ capacity to expel equal and free 
individuals from such jurisdictions.  
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As in the examples of reconciliation, personal and socio-
economic, discussed above, I see the parties as not being in the 
same bargaining position. Their reconciliation would thus probably 
not entail an exactly proportional accountability of losses and gains. 
At the moment, it is a fact that little can be done to significantly 
curtail immigration; and this little does have very high costs 
(financially, e.g. costs with border patrol and physical walls in 
relation to the GDP, and psychologically, e.g. xenophobia and 
terrorism). The driving forces behind the increasing human mobility 
such as globalisation, wars and climate change are simply too strong 
to be fought back at the state level. Experience, confirmed once 
again with the current refugee crisis, shows that when people need 
or want to move, they will do so whether it is legal or not, whether 
it is dangerous or not, and whether they are welcome or not. Today, 
to significantly reduce immigration to a desired level for territorial 
states that understand immigration as a threat to their sovereignty, 
if possible, would require an aggressive politics of security and 
hostility against the Others that is, by now, inconsistent with the 
values liberal democracies are committed to.  
A reconciliation at that point thus seems to require an 
acquiescence to increasing international human mobility as an 
imposition of our times followed by a reaction that aims at 
rebounding ourselves to our institutions in a new way. Territorial 
states must, I argue, be reinvented in a way that they are no longer 
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consist in the sovereignty of a people that has exclusive rights to 
settlement and membership; but rather in an externally recognized 
sovereignty of well-functioning institutions for setting adequate 
conditions to create a system for the development of personal 
autonomy of free individuals that can choose their state 
membership. If not reinvented in this way territorial states can risk 
to become obsolete before we have a new functional system in 
place. This could well lead to the loss of effective protection of 
individuals since it today is still centred at the state level. It is true 
that one has to recognize the advancements of NGO’s and 
international organizations in protecting the rights of individuals 
around the globe, but such institutions are financed by charity and 
not taxes, which would create an unstable and easily overwhelmed 
source of protection. Given this, we see that a reconciliation appears 
to be important not because the institutions of the past must be 
preserved untouched in the name of some sort of tradition, but 
because, reinvented, they become an important tool to ensure a 
smooth transition to the future.   
To accomplish this reconciliatory task, I explore the possibility 
of state membership being a question of choice in four perspectives 
that correspond to the four self-contained papers composing the 
thesis, outlined in more detail in the next section. I start by 
introducing the possibility of thinking of state membership as a 
question of individual choice from a critical investigation of the 
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meanings of cosmopolitanism throughout the history of Western 
political thinking (Ch. I). The main contribution of this first chapter 
to the overarching thesis is to show that even if it can be argued 
that membership necessarily requires exclusion of non-members, 
this does not serve as a sufficient justification for the states’ right to 
exclude immigrants from their territories. This is because, in 
principle, exclusion could also be self-inflicted by individuals able to 
choose the state to settle and become a member. Membership 
would still be exclusive as the concept requires, without violating 
the equality and freedom of individuals across state borders. I 
continue the next chapter by challenging the states’ right to exclude 
immigrants from their territories in more specific settings, material 
and non-material: (1) a setting that conceives territory as a 
meaningful piece of land capable of justifying the exclusive right to 
settlement; and (2) a setting that conceives territory as the physical 
result of civic boundaries capable of justifying the exclusive right to 
membership (Ch. II). The main contribution of this second chapter 
to the overarching argument of the thesis is to propose the 
detachment of the meaning of territory from the right to exclude and 
conceiving it as a matrix, i.e. as a set of conditions that provides a 
determined system for the development of free and equal 
individuals. The following chapter is dedicated to contest not the 
criteria of exclusion as the first two, but the criteria of inclusion 
(Ch. III). It contests naturalisation procedures, i.e. the process of 
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turning the ‘alien’ into ‘natural’, as the access door for full political 
membership at the state level. The main contribution of this chapter 
is to show that naturalising practices cannot determine state 
membership and the access to basic rights that should follow that. 
In the final chapter, I deal with the economic arguments attempting 
to justify the states’ right to exclude through the need of securing 
the borders of the welfare in order not to break the system. This 
argument operates on two levels: circumstantial and normative. At 
the circumstantial level, it shows that open borders might not be 
incompatible with a welfare state as commonly assumed. Thus, as 
the alleged trade-off is shown to be, at least, questionable, it cannot 
serve as a solid grounding for the justification of the states’ right to 
exclude. At the normative level, it challenges the 
instrumentalisation of human mobility for maximisation of either 
global or national outputs and it proposes a reframed question for 
economics that addresses human mobility for promoting the 
wellbeing of free and equal persons willing to lose to help the other.  
 
5. Outline of the Chapters  
Chapter I- Right to Hospitality, Right to Membership: A Critical Review of 
Kant’s and Benhabib’s Accounts on Immigration and Borders 
 
Task: To expand the scope of the right to state membership and 
open the possibility for state membership to be seen as a question 




The first paper explores the different conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism in the history of Western thinking in order to use 
them as analytical tools for the establishment of a suitable basis for 
a concrete idea of cosmopolitanism that would comprise a dynamic 
structure of multiple and interactive borders. The goal is to 
introduce the possibility of conciliating the increasing demands for 
free international human mobility with territorial states through the 
expansion of the scope of the right to state membership. This 
expansion will show that, if reframed, state membership does not 
necessarily require the states’ right to exclude. Laying out the main 
subject of this thesis, I argue that this conciliation between free 
international human mobility and territorial states can be achieved 
if state membership becomes a question of individual choice.  
I start the paper by examining the two Western origins of the 
concept of cosmopolitanism: Cynicism and Stoicism. While Stoicism 
conceived individuals as members of several communities 
concomitantly, Cynicism conceived individuals as detached from 
them. Although the critical value of Cynicism is acknowledged, due 
to its negative consequences for the political dimension, its 
contribution to my thesis remained limited. Following the Stoic 
tradition, I focused my attention to the modern context in which the 
emergence of state sovereignty turned the former conception of 
dynamic interactions among multiple borders more static, and to 
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the current context in which state borders have become, more 
accurately, shields. Of course, in ancient times, not everybody could 
evenly enjoy the right to mobility. As Alan Dowty (1987) shows 
when describing the history of borders, mobility, at the time, was a 
distinctive right of free men in relation to slaves. Later, it became a 
form of distinction between masters and serfs. However, when 
serfdom was replaced by wage labour during the early Renaissance, 
the mobility of workers, especially unskilled ones, continued to be 
restricted. In this period, instead of the expansion of the right to 
mobility and membership, states became more powerful and took 
over control over their borders. This power started to be contested, 
first by John Locke and then by Adam Smith, but it was Kant who 
proposed the foundation of a cosmopolitan law regulating the rights 
and duties of states and foreign individuals regarding mobility and 
border control; and that is why the discussion on Kant becomes an 
important part in this chapter. The right to hospitality represents 
the first stages of what would later become the right to membership 
in cosmopolitan law.  
The Kantian cosmopolitan law, however, was restricted to the 
right to hospitality, a concern for sociability rules among nations, 
and a respect for individuals’ rights that did not include a claim for 
political membership. In an attempt to overcome this limitation, 
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Seyla Benhabib (2004) proposes an influential and prize-worthy4 
expansion of the Kantian cosmopolitan law to integrate the 
individual’s right to state membership. Membership is defended by 
her as a human right. Built upon Hannah Arendt’s principle of ‘right 
to have rights’ (Benhabib 2004:49-69), the right to membership was 
asserted as a moral right shared equally by every individual to be 
protected by legal rights. However, according to Benhabib, the right 
to membership is to be taken with caution when confronted with 
state sovereignty. She acknowledges that the increasing 
international human mobility has challenged state sovereignty in 
many domains such as the “economic, military and technological” 
(2004:6), but she seems to accept the fact that such sovereignty is 
still asserted through border control. This is because, according to 
her, new forms of globalisation transforming sovereignty in terms of 
border control are not yet in place. Based on that, she argues that 
the claims for membership cannot be exaggerated. The right to 
membership, in this sense, should not entail a regime of complete 
freedom of mobility and membership, but of porous borders 
instead; a regime in which the achievement of human rights would 
be advanced one small step further, but in which the states would 
still keep this last bit of sovereignty over their borders.  
                                         
4 Winner of the North American Society for Social Philosophy's award for best 
book in social philosophy in 2004 and of the Ralph Bunche Award of the 
American Political Science Association. 
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The problem with the porous border approach is that, in 
practice, this means that borders are still selectively managed. This 
leaves space for states to allow mobility for only certain kinds of 
immigrants, i.e., those who could bring benefits to the hosting 
states, at the expense of others. When looking into the history of 
borders and seeing how mobility was restricted for slaves and serfs, 
it is difficult to see how the porous borders approach would 
improve this unfair practice since ‘porous’ would mean different 
things for white- and blue-collar workers, for instance. For the 
latter, the porous border is more likely to mean a restriction of 
mobility than an open possibility for it.  
 The cautious account of the right to membership is imposed 
based on an assessment that borders are necessary to ensure the 
functioning of democracy. As states are still seen as the basic 
structure in which societal wellbeing is founded, the promotion of 
this wellbeing seems to be dependent on the institution of the state, 
which requires the maintenance of their territorial, civic and 
political borders. Civic borders are, according to Benhabib, built 
through democratic iterations between the people and the state 
(2004: 19; 176-182). Through these iterations along time, people 
create a space of jurisdiction around them and acquire the right to 
protect it. In order for this space to be protected, mediated by the 
members’ right to self-rule, the states acquire the right to exclude.  
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This argument for porous borders, in defence of the states’ 
right to exclude, brings other problems. First, it fails to account for 
the emerging forms of membership that surpass the scope of the 
state. Democratic iterations are already escaping the scope of the 
state, i.e., persons with similar interests are already able to connect 
with each other irrespective of state borders. This might create a 
space for democratic iterations at the international or global sphere. 
Thus, democratic iterations between the people and the state in 
itself should no longer be seen as barriers for the expansion of a 
more positive meaning of the right to membership. This means that, 
democratic iterations might no longer be a reason to understand 
state borders as necessarily fixing civic boundaries and we could 
start to envisage other possibilities of organising political 
representation in higher levels.  
Another problem is that the pure meaning of ‘membership’ is 
here problematic. Membership is understood as necessarily 
implying the right to exclude. But even though membership 
necessarily implies a kind of exclusion, i.e., a member of the group 
A will necessarily be a non-member of the group non-A, this does 
not imply that the members of the group A must hold the right to 
determine who should be a member of A. With the advancement of 
universal human rights in a more positive direction, the individual’s 
right to choose must be highlighted. Paying attention to individual 
rights, it seems that the exclusion provoked by membership should 
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rather be self-inflicted. This means that individuals, through the 
exercise of the choice of being a member of A, would self-exclude 
themselves of being a member of non-A. Membership would still be 
exclusive, but the exclusion should be a consequence of individual 
choice. Based on that I expect to have opened the possibility to 
think of state membership as being a question of choice.  
 
Chapter II- Territorial Rights of Liberal Democratic States: Challenging the 
Right to Exclude Immigrants 
 
Task: To challenge the territorial rights of contemporary liberal 
democratic states for lacking a justification for the right to exclude 
immigrants from their territorial and civic borders and to propose a 
new way of conceiving them. 
 
In the second paper, I argue that liberal democratic states are no 
longer able to consistently maintain the right to exclude immigrants 
from their territorial and civic borders. I challenge two key 
arguments in favour of border control related to meanings 
commonly attributed to territory: (1) territory as a piece of land, 
and (2) territory as the physical result of civic boundaries. These 
arguments are: (1) supporting the states’ exclusive right to 
determine settlement in their territory; and (2) defending the 
exclusive right to determine membership in their civic borders. I 
argue that contemporary liberal democratic states (1) do not hold a 
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distinctive connection to a particular piece of land that enables them 
to justify such exclusive right to settlement, and (2) that actual 
states’ members can no longer consistently maintain the right to 
unilateral coercion capable of restricting access to state 
membership. Finally, (3) I outline an alternative understanding of 
territorial rights by proposing to understand territory as being a 
matrix, i.e. a set of conditions that provides a determined system for 
individual self-development.  
In the first section, I argue that contemporary liberal 
democratic states do not have a restrictive relationship to a 
particular piece of land, which is capable of justifying the exclusive 
right to settlement. This is because, when looking into the history 
of state borders, we see that the present configuration is the result 
of a variety of contingencies, such as wars, asymmetrical power 
relationships, contracts, luck and hazard, among others. This shows 
that the present border configuration should not easily be taken for 
granted as fixed structures when attempting to justify states’ 
exclusive right to settlement in a determined area. Borders are 
contingent and change according to the political context. If we then 
admit that the emergence of liberal democratic states is changing 
the context together with the reframing of sovereignty, we seem to 
have reasons to challenge the attempt to justify the right to 
exclusive settlement today, based on the context of yesterday. The 
same movement has happened with other concepts that have 
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become more inclusive. Different contexts produce different 
concepts. Because state borders are settled, for reasons of political 
stability, we might not want them to change, at least not abruptly, 
when the main structures for promoting the wellbeing of the people 
are still organised at the state level. But it seems to be possible to 
keep the state territorial borders as jurisdictional unities for 
individual self-development without sustaining their right to 
prevent people to move in and settle in these territories. This is the 
way cantons and member states of federations already work.  
In the second section, I show that even when territory means 
political membership in a democracy, the demos does not have to be 
bounded, as is often argued. Actually, this position of a bounded 
demos leads to serious conceptual, internal and external 
contradictions that can be overcome by conceiving the demos in an 
alternative way. Internally, political power is only legitimated by the 
people’s will, but the holders of this will are not democratically 
grouped themselves. Externally, popular sovereignty demands that 
power legitimacy requires that the subjects participate in the 
shaping of the laws and rules they are supposed to follow, but a 
bounded demos would give the members the illegitimate coercive 
power to rule over non-members as well. Considering these 
inconsistencies, I then examined the directly opposed alternative to 
a bounded demos, i.e. of conceiving an unbounded demos instead. 
In this perspective, members and non-members could vote 
MELINA DUARTE 
88 
anywhere, anytime, forming a global demos. This alternative, 
however, proved to be inimical to democracy when understood as 
more than a procedure, i.e. as a set of values and principles; and to 
be unviable due to practical limitations of the democratic structures 
being still, to a certain extent, confined to the state level. After 
dismissing both, bounded and unbounded conception of the demoi, 
I introduced my alternative: conceiving what I called a non-pre-
bounded demos: a demos that is still formed by defined members, 
but where membership is not determined by the state’s unilateral 
decision, but rather becomes a question of individual choice.  
 
Chapter III – State Membership: Contesting Naturalisation as the Access 
Door to Electoral Rights at the State Level 
 
Task: To argue that, within liberal democracies, naturalisation 
should not be a necessary condition for the granting of electoral 
rights for state members. 
 
In the third paper, I contest the political borders of liberal 
democratic states. Given that such states are committed to the 
promotion and protection of individual rights, pluralism and 
tolerance and universal suffrage, we can see that the restriction of 
electoral rights at the state level from non-naturalised residents 
violates the coherence between the values they stand for and their 
policies. This is because naturalisation, as the process of 
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transforming the ‘alien’ into ‘natural’, is a kind of nationalising 
practice blending with the ideal of a non-nationalised model of 
citizenship. These violations can be expressed as follows: 
(1) It denies the status of political equality to non-citizen 
residents that are already state members and eligible to most 
civil and social rights once attached to national citizenship. 
(2) It imposes the nationalisation of state members through 
naturalisation in a context in which states are progressively 
being denationalised, mixing up state membership with 
nationhood.  
(3) It denies suffrage for state members in a context in which 
universal suffrage is acknowledged by human rights law 
(UDHR Article XXI). 
My proposal to overcome these problems is to claim that electoral 
rights should be detached from a national conception citizenship 
that is dependent on naturalisation and be based on domicile 
instead. Citizenship has become an ambiguous and static concept 
incapable of dealing with the new emerging forms of membership of 
a globalised world of increasing mobility across borders. Defined as 
a status that grants civil, political, and social rights to citizens, 
citizenship has lost much of its meaning with the strength of human 
rights. Many of the civil and social rights as defined by T.H. Marshal 
(1950) are today acknowledged human rights that cannot exclude 
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non-citizen residents from its entitlements. In this sense, we can see 
that the national conception of citizenship is progressively being 
replaced by a cosmopolitan citizenship. A citizenship that is not 
only based on moral obligations towards every human being, but 
that moves towards the expansion of the political equality that 
derives from that. Political rights, however, are, to a certain extent, 
still restricted to national citizens, but as prolonged alienation is not 
desirable in liberal democracies that benefits from attracting skilled 
migrants, electoral rights have already been expanded to non-
citizens at the local and regional levels. Electoral rights at the state 
level, however, remain exclusive for citizens and access to them 
depend on naturalisation.  
With this in mind, I start the paper by contesting 
naturalisation procedures for not being coherent with the values to 
which liberal democracies subscribe. Even if these procedures have 
been weakened, the Netherlands being an exception, naturalisation 
still has a strong symbolic meaning that constrains the relationship 
between mobile individuals and states. Based on an idea of national 
identity, these procedures call for the standardisation of plurality 
and a proof of worthiness and loyalty at the very personal and 
subjective level. In the ceremonies of naturalisation in, for example, 
the UK or the US, non-citizen residents are placed in a room full of 
flags and pictures of authorities. There, they are welcomed to the 
‘super-family’ by an often strangely, formally, dressed man and have 
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to swear allegiances to the new country, promising to be loyal 
subjects and to respect the law. But this is not all. To be at the 
ceremony, non-citizens have to meet, among others, requirements 
such as “good character” in the UK or “Dutch values” in the 
Netherlands.  
Some will defend that these requirements are important for 
social cohesion and political stability, but also for the protection of 
the national identity of the nation-states. Others will argue for the 
abolition of citizenship tests and of subjective requirements for 
naturalisation. For the latter, naturalisation should be either 
automatic or purely based on the time of residency. I, on the other 
hand, argue that not only should citizenship tests and subjective 
criteria for naturalisation be abolished, but also naturalisation in 
itself as the access door to electoral rights at the state level.  
In the second section, I discuss the problems arising from 
immigration policies that restrict electoral rights to citizens, 
disqualifying other state members that domicile in the states’ 
territory. The first problem is one of democratic legitimacy. This is 
because non-citizen residents are directly affected by laws they have 
not had the chance to help shape. Self-determination is defended as 
an individual and not a collective right. Therefore, non-citizen 
residents, as well as resident citizens should be entitled to it. 
Second, naturalisation, through the lenses of liberal democratic 
thinking is a coercive practice in itself when imposing the 
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standardisation of identity into a ‘natural’ form for those not 
seeking it. Third, naturalisation does not promote social integration.  
In the third section, I analyse the responses of other liberal 
democratic theorists and consider them unsatisfactory because, 
through the support to naturalisation procedures, they still link 
electoral rights at the state level with a national conception of 
citizenship; this despite proposing considerably weakening the 
requirements for naturalisation. 
In the fourth section, in a maximalist approach towards the 
abolishment of naturalisation and achievement of political equality 
for non-citizen residents, I disaggregate different forms of 
membership in order to show that state membership differs from 
nationhood. Therefore, even if naturalisation would be a reasonable 
requirement for the acquisition of nationality, nationality should 
not be a necessary condition for the access to basic rights such as 
electoral rights at the state level.  
 
Chapter IV - Open Borders and Welfare States: Can’t They Really Get Along? 
 
Task: To contest welfare states’ objections to international freedom 
of mobility. 
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After having problematized the borders of states and political 
membership at the normative level and pointed to the need of 
rethinking them in more inclusive ways that better correspond to 
the commitments to liberal democratic values, I move to the 
circumstantial level in order to contest the borders of welfare states. 
Assuming that, at this point in my thesis, some readers might 
sympathise with my overall argument that argues that open borders 
should ideally be compatible with state political membership, they 
could still reject the thesis based on practical limitations. Thus, even 
if open borders appear as the just idea to have in the back of our 
minds, the consequences of its implementation in the real world 
today could still be said to be disastrous.  
At the risk of being more vulnerable to criticisms than in the 
first three chapters, I decided to address this age-old gap between 
‘should’ and ‘can’, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, ‘ideal’ and ‘real’. This is 
because I do believe that there are realistic ideals, i.e., ideals which 
we are to pursue concretely, and open borders might be one of 
them. The list of circumstantial objections to open borders is indeed 
extensive. Open borders are said to threaten national security, 
public order, national economy, among others. All these issues are 
very complex and I do not undermine them. But I had to make a 
choice here and my choice was to deal with the circumstantial 
objection to open borders that I considered to be the most 
challenging: the welfare states.  
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Since Milton Friedman, the incompatibility between open 
borders and welfare states has been largely assumed. Even today, 
libertarians argue that open borders would boost global economic 
growth, but that the consequences would be the dismantling of 
welfare regimes, particularly of the social democratic ones. This is 
because as this regime is based on the active promotion of high 
levels of social equality, they would work as magnets for immigrants 
seeking social benefits. As this social equality is achieved mainly by 
redistribution of tax money, the magnet would work only in one 
direction, i.e., attracting those immigrants that use more benefits 
than they pay tax and deterring immigrants whose contributions 
outnumber the social benefits received. Assuming that individuals 
would migrate to places where they would benefit most, social 
welfare states would receive more tax receivers than taxpayers and 
their economies would break down. To avoid this tragic end, social 
democratic welfare states are advised to change their regimes in the 
direction of liberal market models when facing increasing 
immigration.  
The problem is that, even if open borders emerges as a 
requirement of individual freedom of mobility as advocated by 
libertarians, and even if it would boost the global economic growth 
as advocated by utilitarians, we know that social democratic welfare 
states today, due to their increased capacity to promote equality, 
perform better in many important segments that constitute a well-
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functioning society, such as lower levels of health problems (mental 
and physical), lower rates of criminality, unemployment, child 
mortality, poverty among the elderly, among others. This means 
that, inside their borders, such welfare states appear to able to 
promote freedom and equality of opportunities in more meaningful 
ways than other economic systems. Considering this, it appeared 
problematic to me to endorse Friedman-like positions for open 
borders if this had to be done at the expense of welfare states.  
I then looked at the view of another economist, Martin Ruhs, 
who endorses the opposite of Friedman’s view, i.e., given the trade-
off between open borders and welfare states, he defends the 
protection of welfare regimes at the expense of open borders. The 
argument is that in order to promote national economic growth, 
borders should be controlled. My idea was to approach both 
directions from where a trade-off was conceived in order to examine 
whether a window to contest it would open. I found a window. In 
fact, I found two. One in which I could look inside the dynamics of 
economics and the other that allowed me to look outside it. This 
way of expressing my methodology might appear too metaphoric, 
especially because in the paper, I used the metaphor of boxes 
instead of windows. But these metaphors are useful to explain my 




The look inside was useful in order to engage in a more 
instrumental debate that affects immigration control ‘here’ and 
‘right now’. Looking inside, I found not only economic objections 
based on fiscal stress sustaining the trade-off between open borders 
and welfare states, but also social objections based on the risk of 
welfare states loosing public support when facing the increase of 
heterogeneity led by immigration. The look outside brought the 
moral philosophical contributions to the front of a debate that 
affects immigration control in relation to an ideal of justice. The 
goal was to make the link from a ‘can’ that indicates possibility to a 
‘should’ that is more concrete than the one expressed in the first 
three chapters.  
My response to the fiscal problem was to show that instead of 
producing fiscal stress, immigration is currently contributing to the 
fiscal balance of countries (or unions) with low or negative natural 
population growth. One might think I am saying that free 
immigration is the solution to the fiscal problem, but I am not. I am 
saying, instead, that immigration is not part of the problem and will 
not be part of the problem for the next 20 years. Of course, instead 
of increasing human mobility across borders in order to decrease 
the dependency ratio between workers and dependents, we could 
incentivise the increase of births in such countries where natural 
growth is low or negative. But the question then would be: can we 
really go in this direction on a planet that is already overpopulated 
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and suffering the consequences of climate change due to that? I 
think not. Of course, instead of increasing human mobility across 
borders in order to decrease the dependence ratio, we could still 
substitute public pensions for private ones. But, relying on 
Bowman’s comparative studies (2014), I argue that this solution is 
not suitable either. And this is because social problems require 
collective responsibilities. No matter how many private pension 
funds are available, there is always going to be someone that is not 
able to afford it. Should we then blame the elderly for not being 
“entrepreneurial” enough to secure their own pensions? I think not.  
My response to the social problem was first to confront old 
empirical studies based on a misguided methodology with more 
complete and recent ones that demystified the correlation between 
increasing heterogeneity and the decrease of welfare states’ public 
support. Then, I further investigated the reasons behind the 
hypothesis that holds such a correlation, be it negative or positive. 
The reason behind this is the assumption that solidarity could be 
negatively affected if the identity of the group is disrupted by the 
inclusion of strangers. But I argue that the worse the stranger is 
pictured, the stronger would the welfare states’ public support tend 
to be. Allied with Luhman’s sociological interpretation on risk, the 
inclusion of strangers conceived as a strong threat to natives’ social 
security would give the latter a stronger, not weaker, reason to 
support the welfare regime. Of course, it can be argued that natives, 
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being part of a community built over time, have the right not to be 
exposed to such threats; that, based on the protection of this alleged 
common identity, they could determine who is equal and who is 
different from a political point of view. But even if they have the 
right to have their homogeneity protected by liberal democratic 
states, does that mean that these states should be homogeneous 
themselves? I think not.  
For these complex problems, we need more sophisticated 
solutions and that is why the look outside becomes so important. 
What is contested in this perspective are the conditions that bring 
the trade-off between open borders and welfare states into 
existence. These conditions are imposed by an intrinsic take on 
economics and extrinsic take on human lives. The intrinsic take on 
economics imposes target-oriented actions and decisions on 
individuals that are given no choice but to aim for success in certain 
terms, i.e., at the expense of others. These target-oriented ways are 
said to be rational, but I argue that, in fact, they are the opposite. 
They impose a negation of our rationality that goes beyond strategic 
abilities and is expressed through deliberation and choice. It 
delegates it to numbers, evidences, and facts that necessarily point 
in one direction: one that brings most benefits to the self at the 
expense of others. The capacity of distinguishing between right and 
wrong eludes in a sentence: ‘we did what we had to do’.  
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The extrinsic take on human lives is problematic for several 
reasons that I call ‘the forgotten obvious’: (1) human beings are not 
commodities; (2) the meaning of life cannot be reduced to a 
monetary value; (3) human rights should not be for sale; and (4) 
human rights should not be inheritable. To bring this forgotten 
obvious to light, I evoke Sandel’s critique of economics (2013) to 
argue that a clear line between what is intrinsic and extrinsic needs 
to be drawn urgently. Based on this need, I argue that economics 
should be subordinated to universal morality when expanding its 
initial scope of dealing with production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods to deal with human rights and mobility. In 
this sense, economics should not lead us to evade the responsibility 
to respect individuals as free and equal persons. With this in mind, I 
proposed a new starting question for economics, taking mutual 
respect into account. If we commit to that responsibility, we see 
that open borders and welfare states might not be contradictory to 
each other, but complementary. Both move towards a common goal, 
which is to promote equality. The domestic challenges that social 
democratic welfare regimes face to promote internal equality can be 
expanded. Newcomers might change the quantity, but not the 
quality of the challenge, and this indicates that we might already 
have an answer to overcome the alleged trade-off when looking at 
the inner functioning of social democratic welfare states. This 
means that, guided by mutual respect, individuals might be more 
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responsive to redistribution and become more supportive of welfare 
regimes. With the spread of such regimes worldwide, welfare would 
not be the magnet for tax receiving migrants it is alleged to be.  
To conclude, I want to expand my argument a little bit more 
in order to refute the vision of the tragic end of the welfare states in 
the case of opening the borders, as defended by Friedman. I would 
like to remark that even if economics does not reformulate its 
starting question and continues to assume this radically egotistic 
view of individuals’ ability to empathise only with themselves and 
their kin, it could still be argued, with the same speculative tools 
used by Friedman, that open borders, rather than posing a problem 
for social democratic welfare states, would threaten liberal market 
regimes. I explain how: seeking the most benefits, immigrants with 
lower skills could perhaps prefer to migrate to states where they can 
work and accumulate as much as money as possible to send to their 
families abroad whom they plan to re-join one day. Considering that 
not everybody is willing to bear the psychological and economic 
costs of migration, even in times of adversity, there will always be 
someone who prefers to stay and are in need of assistance. In social 
democratic welfare regimes, working hours are regulated and social 
benefits do not come in the form of cash transfers, but as benefits 
such as education, health care, and public services. The costs of 
living in social democratic states are very high and with high 
taxation. Based on that, we could think that this might make it hard 
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to accumulate money and satisfy the immediate needs that would 
benefit low-skilled workers and their families abroad the most. On 
the other hand, immigrants who do not have dependents abroad, 
and are usually more educated, would possibly find most benefits in 
social democratic regimes that provides them with a higher quality 
of life. Thus, contrary to Friedman’s prediction, another possible 
result of open borders would then be that liberal market regimes 
would attract low-skilled migrants and become countries of 
production of basic goods, while social democratic states would 
attract more skilled migrants and become countries richer in human 
capital and production of technology and services. What would be 
tragic, in this sense, is that liberal market regimes would become 
the third-world. In order to avoid this, they should be advised to 
change their policies towards more robust welfare regimes.  
 
6. Methodological Considerations  
In this section, I aim at clarifying the structure and argumentative 
methodology I will use throughout my thesis. Regarding the thesis 
structure, it is important to remark that it does not follow the 
format of a monograph, but the format of a paper collection. 
Accordingly, this is not a study of a unified theme structured in 
sequential chapters, but it has a broader focus on an overarching 
theme that is structured in self-contained articles published or 
publishable separately. These self-contained articles are subject to a 
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series of limitations that monograph chapters are not. They must, 
for example, be adapted to size limit, literature and to the ongoing 
debate in the journal their publication is aimed at. These different 
demands might have caused a lack of continuity in the chapters 
composing the thesis, so readers should not expect specific 
arguments engaged in one chapter to contribute directly with the 
argumentative chain of the other chapters as in a monograph.  
Another important remark regarding the structure is that the 
chapters follow an order of discovery and show the progress of my 
thinking. They were written in very different stages of my PhD— 
being the first in 2012 (the year I began) and the last in 2016 (the 
year I finished). The chapters are based on papers and were revised 
to compose the thesis, in some cases, substantially. The first 
chapter, for example, is more historical and investigative. It does 
not defend the main thesis in a strong sense. On the contrary, the 
thesis is there born from an historical investigation of the different 
foundational types of cosmopolitanism and the unveiling of a 
specific type that allows multiple memberships. The historical 
approach started from Cynics (negative cosmopolitanism), Stoics 
(positive cosmopolitanism), Kant (legal cosmopolitanism) and 
ended with a contemporary take on it with Benhabib. Though the 
first three choices seemed to be necessary, I could have chosen 
other contemporary authors that follow the same historical chain 
than Benhabib such as Habermas, for example. But her prize-
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winning approach on the right to membership appeared to be a 
good representative of a complex thought that mixes particularists 
and universalist elements. The chapter already had a very large 
scope throughout the history of Western thinking and I was 
constrained by time and space to consider other contemporary 
authors. The second chapter was substantially revised for the thesis 
in order to clarify the argument and further develop its positive part. 
The third chapter contains important conceptual distinctions that 
were implicit in the original version. And the fourth chapter, 
contains a few specifications to clarify my approach. For instance, in 
the latter chapter, I am not arguing that open borders are indeed 
compatible with the welfare state. The verbal sentence “to be 
compatible with” was never used to describe this relation in the 
original version, but I included now some italic forms to highlight 
the scope of my claim. I also never wanted to suggest a complete 
reorientation of economics devaluing empirical research, but only to 
propose that this research should be put in a larger perspective 
when theorising on human mobility.  
 Regarding the argumentative methodology, its clarification is 
important because, since I am arguing for open borders, it can 
appear as if I am engaging in a purely abstract and theoretical 
project that has little to do with the real world, but I am not; at 
least, not entirely. First, I admit I have an idealised project in the 
background of my thesis that aims at achieving justice in terms of 
MELINA DUARTE 
104 
freedom and equality for all, natives and foreigners, citizens and 
immigrants, insiders and outsiders. I blur these differences and 
connect them as human beings of equal standing. Second, I admit 
that, to some extent, I consider that our moral universal 
commitment towards this equality entails political commitments to 
achieve them. However, as in Thomas Pogge’s (2005) methodology, 
my starting point is not a theory of justice in itself, but rather the 
diagnosis of injustices occurring in the real world due to illegitimate 
exclusions. In this sense, my claim arises from the conclusion that, 
because these exclusions in the real world are illegitimate according 
to the ideal world, we must attempt to revert them.  
The linkage between an ideal and a real world, i.e., between 
moral universal commitments to political ones, is not direct in my 
thesis, but contextual. I am not arguing that because we are morally 
committed to consider every human being as equal and free, borders 
should necessarily be open. My claim is rather mediated through the 
context in which liberal democracies currently engage with these 
universal values and aim at protecting and promoting the values 
politically. The foundation of the European Court of Human Rights, 
for example, is a clear indication that liberal democracies have taken 
a stand towards political commitments to achieve and implement 
moral universal values. Going in this direction, my claim is not 
based on an argument of necessity of open borders, but on one of 
consistency between values and practices of liberal democracies. Of 
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course, there is much disagreement about how to define what these 
liberal democratic values are in the first place. And, of course, 
theory and practice will never match completely. Nevertheless, I 
believe that I am not being excessively demanding when expecting 
the compliance to no more than individual rights, pluralism and 
tolerance, and universal suffrage. I hold the view that I am not being 
too demanding when expecting this compliance, not because I 
believe these values are easy to achieve, but because they seem to be 
at the very core of the definition of liberal democracy; and this, in a 
way, that if we exclude one of these values, we will be endorsing a 
regime other than liberal democracy. Joseph Carens (see [1987] 
2008) and Philip Cole (2000) apply a similar methodology. This 
claim can be expressed as follows:  
 
(i) Liberal democracies are defined as X, Y, and Z.  
(ii) They are engaged to X, Y, and Z morally as well as 
politically.  
(iii) Politically, in the real world, liberal democratic states 
violate X, Y, and Z.  
Therefore, there is an inconsistency between their values 




The solution to this inconsistency can, however, go in different 
directions. Weakening my claim for open borders, liberal democratic 
states could decide to drop political commitments to X, Y, and Z in 
order to achieve consistency. They could also drop the whole liberal 
democratic project and redefine themselves according to less 
ambitious values. If one of these things happened, my argument for 
open borders would be seriously compromised. However, I have 
good reason to think this will not happen besides the fact that my 
fingers are crossed. The reason is that the commitments to these 
liberal democratic values do not arise from a simple good heart; they 
are the conditions that will enable the realisation of a larger project 
of promoting social progress and economic development. Historic-
structuralists rooted in neo-marxism criticise the fact that liberal 
democratic values are essential to the development of capitalism 
and globalisation. Although the critique is fair when arguing that 
freedom of mobility of persons across borders would give room to a 
lot of exploitation by large corporations, some liberal democratic 
regimes have shown how it is possible to balance the negative 
effects. Liberal democracies, despite having a common political plan 
and all being capitalists, differ considerably when it comes to more 
specific economic projects. Some liberal democracies are based on 
the liberal market as in the case of the US, but not all. Others are 
conservative welfare states, such as Germany, and others are social 
democratic welfare states, such as Norway (Bowman 2014).   
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While Carens, after years of migration scholarship and a 
background in sociology, argues that the solution to such an 
inconsistency between the values and practices in liberal democratic 
states can be found in the contextual analysis that more closely 
considers the specific cases where tensions between peoples and 
territories emerge (Carens 2000), Cole proposes to reformulate 
political theory as a whole (Cole 2000). My proposal is to try to 
bridge the gap between theory and just practices, by focusing on the 
attempt to make theory feasible through the institutions that we 
currently have in place. This, despite the risks that a more practical 
account entails in terms of vulnerability of the argument to criticism 
when confronting changeable circumstances from all sides. There is 
never merely one solution to practical problems, and they are never 
final.  
Like in Allen Buchanan’s (2004) methodology, I presuppose 
the current reality in which we are organised through a system of 
states and I do not idealise its abolition. In fact, I presume that its 
abolition would probably cause quite a lot of trouble today as states 
are still the basic structure for the distribution and enforcement of 
rights and duties. This is to say that, in my thesis, open borders do 
not equal the complete absence of borders. It means rather that 
state borders should be open for free movement of persons across 
them. The states’ jurisdictions are to remain as long as their reality 
actually lasts. And in this sense, I do not aim at idealising the 
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necessity of states either, but rather consider them as Saskia Sassen 
(2008) does, i.e., as contingent institutions. Thus, even if I have a 
normative goal, i.e., to offer some guidelines for what we should do 
to achieve justice, this is in relation to the current injustices 
generated by flaws in our contingent institutions. By dropping the 
concept of national citizenship and conceiving it in the broader 
terms of state membership, I am not only dropping an ambiguous 
concept that is embedded with a controversial and potentially 
exclusionary idea of national identity, but also opening space for 
thinking of other forms of political memberships that might arise if 
states cease to exist.  
Another important dimension to be considered here is that I 
propose to discuss immigration policies directly when, for example, 
criticising naturalisation procedures and the restriction of electoral 
rights at the state level for non-citizen residents. But more 
generally, I discuss policy, because border control is a policy, not a 
necessity.  
When attempting to move beyond theoretical reasons and ask 
whether and how is it possible to implement realisable ideals into 
the real world, I needed to draw upon more specialised fields of 
knowledge than philosophy in itself.  In an interdisciplinary effort to 
enlighten a problem, and not just a concept, I engaged with other 
fields such as economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, 
and geography. Adrian Favell (2007:260) argues that “there could 
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hardly be a topic more naturally ripe for interdisciplinary thinking 
than migration studies.”  Interdisciplinary studies are, however, still 
seen with a certain degree of scepticism due to failed attempts to 
promote it in the past. A failed attempt, however, does not imply 
that interdisciplinarity is a failed enterprise in itself. The reasons for 
that failure were several, among them: (1) confusion between 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research; (2) lack of a defined 
community of experts that could assess the quality of the 
interdisciplinary research; (3) lack of agreement of regular 
disciplines that coined the use of some terms in specific ways; and 
(4) lack of depth in the name of breadth.  
(1) Despite the willingness of undertaking interdisciplinary 
research, researchers did not venture into other fields while trying 
to connect and integrate contents from different disciplines. Instead, 
they kept working within their domains and organised the final 
research product grouping the individual work of several experts in 
determined fields. This gave rise to multidisciplinary, but not truly 
interdisciplinary accounts. From one perspective, this can be seen as 
a failed attempt to conduct interdisciplinary research, but it can also 
be seen as one step towards it. Readers of multidisciplinary 
volumes, for example, certainly benefitted from such multi-focal 
accounts aiming at being problem-, and not discipline-oriented. 
Women’s Studies, Environmental Ethics and Ecological Economics 
are examples of this successful transition. In many universities, 
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these are not part of the curricula of determined disciplines 
anymore, but having exceeded the scope of them, acquired a life of 
their own. 
According to Carole L. Palmer (2001:vii), “the real-world 
research problems that scientists address rarely arise within orderly 
disciplinary categories, and neither do their solutions.” Considering 
this, I identify my topic of study, migration and borders, as one of 
these multidimensional research problems that requires integration 
between ideas and concepts from one side, and empirical data and 
information from the other side. From this perspective, it seems 
that the limitations of my ‘field of origin’, philosophy, does not have 
to dictate the limitations of my contributions to a topic that is too 
broad and complex for a single-sided discipline.  
(2) It might be that in the past, interdisciplinary studies 
lacked a defined community of experts. This posed some difficulties 
of how to evaluate the merits of a research project through single-
sided disciplinary lenses. Bibliography can lack some cornerstone 
references in one area and include alien ones that single-sided 
experts never have heard about and are not really willing to engage 
with. Philosophers might be critical to the methodology employed 
by empirical studies (e.g. the induction problem), and empirical 
researchers might be critical to the methodology employed by 
philosophers (e.g. the delusional problem). But this initial 
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discomfort is natural, since the aim is to operate beyond these 
restricted areas.  
Migration Studies, however, might have already passed this 
level since a community of interdisciplinary experts in the field 
already exists. At the University of Oxford, for example, there are 
three interdisciplinary centres of Migration Studies, which I had the 
pleasure to visit: The Centre on Migration Policy and Society 
(COMPAS) founded in 2003, The Refugees Study Centre founded in 
1982, and the International Migration Institute founded in 2006. In 
these centres, they start from the presupposition that migration and 
borders are complex issues. There, political scientists, 
anthropologists, economists, geographers, and sociologists, among 
others, have successfully undertaken this task of deconstructing 
migration and borders from many perspectives and using different 
methodologies together. While they have been using empirical data 
to illuminate and advance theory, political philosophy seems to still 
be disconnected from it, i.e., disconnected from the realities of the 
topic. But immigrants do have names and faces. They are not 
abstract entities and theories detached from reality will not help 
them overcome their problems here and now. National identity, 
citizenship and state borders, for example, are all social constructs 
that were built at particular times in our history. They are not 
concepts that can be abstracted from reality and granted a necessity-
status just because the object of philosophy is said to be the 
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necessary instead of the contingent. In order to properly contribute 
to these relevant contemporary issues, I believe, philosophers must 
address this gap by engaging with other fields of knowledge.  
(3) The lack of a common understanding of key concepts, 
such as the meaning of migration in itself, might pose some 
problems for communication between fields. For a biologist, for 
example, human migration might mean a strategy to improve 
chances of survival in the same way used by birds, whales and 
reindeers. For sociologists, migration might be understood in terms 
of movement of persons in time and space loaded with a meaning. 
For economists, human migration seems to be tied to the aim of 
improving living conditions and opportunities. For geographers, 
migration can perhaps be defined in terms of changing landscapes. 
For historians, human migration might be divided into periods: the 
first large migration, the second large migration, and so on. In 
political science, migration is viewed more in terms of tensions: 
tensions between migrants and states, migrants and communities, 
and migrants and citizens. We might have to adapt to a new 
vocabulary and language when working across disciplines, but why 
does this sound so difficult? In philosophy, we are used to starting 
with definitions and when we do not find one, things get very 
confusing. But, after all, we are also used to build new concepts and 
to concede some others just for the sake of the argument. The 
capacity of proper abstraction from philosophy might help here in 
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the task of laying the ground for a common debate across 
disciplines, occupied with contemporary questions, not with burial 
ones. Until then, we can operate together with a general definition 
of migration that consists simply of human mobility.  
(4) The last point that I would like to raise here is the 
criticism that interdisciplinary studies receive for compromising on 
depth for breadth. I do not think that this is a fair criticism. First, 
because the research is still done by experts, i.e., by persons that 
have spent at least 10 years of their lives, from their bachelor’s to 
doctoral degree, in academia. It is hard to see how highly educated 
academics can become intellectually handicapped and lose their 
ability to seek depth just because the picture is suddenly more 
complex and the boundaries of the topic not very well defined. 
Second, we might have to ask: What is depth and what is breadth in 
such a context? Depth might not be the achievement of a 
formulation of a sound theory of justice that operates perfectly only 
in an idealised world, nor the achievement of the collection and 
analysis of long-term data. Depth might actually be the opposite and 
achieved only through breadth. This is because cognitive 
advancements and the progress of knowledge are not tied to single, 
but rather, are dependent on the capacity to integrate knowledge 
and methodologies across disciplines (see Mansilla 2005:16). Third, 
the world did not change just because we started to see it 
fragmented into disciplines of specialisation through positivist 
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lenses. The world is still complex and to understand it in depth we 
will need to cross the boundaries of expertise and create and 
cultivate more interdisciplinary fields of experts in problem-oriented 
topics. In my thesis, I expect to reclaim some of this 
interdisciplinary contents back to philosophy in order to deal with 
the circumstantial objections to open borders not at the expense of 
depth, but to truly search for it.  
This interdisciplinary aim is engaged, not solely, but 
particularly in the fourth paper, when discussing the welfare states’ 
objections to open borders. Through the interdisciplinary lenses, it 
might be that my approach is still too conservative and field-
oriented. But after having found a new route, I will pursue this 
approach further in future research. To conclude, I would like to go 
back to the two background assumptions I mentioned at the 
beginning of this section: (1) conceiving justice in terms of equality 
and freedom for all, and (2) implying that moral commitments to 
equality and freedom for all entails political commitments to 
achieve them. I would like to remark that maybe these assumptions 
might not, after all, be too controversial. Regarding the first 
assumption, it is relatively broadly agreed that human beings are 
free and equal and that they deserve justice. The second 
assumption, however, requires a little more justification. One way 
of justifying it is to appeal to a political cosmopolitan view, which is 
the one I engaged with in my thesis. Another way that I will briefly 
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mention here is to appeal to the fact that universal commitments to 
universal equality and freedom did not emerge first as a moral claim 
that now needs to be transposed into political ones, but the 
opposite. According to the historian of law Samuel Moyn (2012), 
these commitments emerged first in the political discourse after the 
WWII in order to counter-balance non-democratic ideologies. 
Hence, if they were political in the first place, they can become 
political again, I hope, with genuine efforts.  
Open borders are not only possible in an “ideal world”. The 
European Union is not an ideal world. I come from a developing 
country, once called the Third World, and so far, borders have not 
been closed to me. I moved to whichever countries I wanted; seven 
thus far. Of course, this does not mean that borders are already 
open for all, but this certainly means that they are already open for 
some. There is only a little bit further to go in order to make human 
mobility across borders just for all in the real world. The 
consideration of these realities of the world, however since they are 
complex, cannot be properly done through the lenses of a single-
sided discipline. Political philosophy, for example, would be unable 
to guide policy-making and attempt to promote effective social 
transformation if not engaging or dialoguing with other more 
specialised fields of knowledge such as economics, sociology, 
political science, geography. I contend that this limitation is 
especially evident in my topic (immigration and borders), when the 
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responsibilities of the researcher towards the society derives from 
the discussion of a very current problem that is affecting so many 
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Concluding Remarks and Prospects for 
Future Research 
Guided by the need to contribute to enlighten the salient debate on 
immigration, I aimed, in this thesis, to offer an alternative 
understanding of states’ borders compatible with freedom of human 
mobility and membership across them. I undertook this task 
puzzled by the conflict between the increasing pressures for 
international human mobility and states’ sovereign right to border 
control. This conflict currently generates serious tensions for both 
individuals and states. From one side, driven by globalisation and 
war, among other factors, individuals are becoming more and more 
mobile. On the other side, compelled to preserve their sovereignty, 
states attempt to restrict this mobility. The outcome of such a 
conflict is unilateral coercion and the limitation of individual 
freedoms, which is accompanied by uncontrollable consequences. 
Among these consequences are the increasing numbers of 
unauthorised immigrants, human trafficking, hostility against 
immigrants, and fatalities related to border crossing as highlighted 
by the Mediterranean incidents.  
Due to the magnitude of the challenge, in addition to other 
global issues, states are cornered into relying on international 
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agreements that take away from them the right to determine 
immigration policies solely according to their national agendas. 
With the consolidation of international law, states, particularly 
liberal democratic ones, are bound by human rights that are 
increasingly enforced; violations are brought to international courts 
(e.g. European Court of Human Rights) or subjected to 
international interventions. Human rights already grant several 
rights of mobility to individuals (e.g. the right to emigrate; right to 
seek asylum; right to regional immigration; right to return to the 
country of origin; right to citizenship), leaving the bounded states 
with not much space for unilateral policy-making on the matter. 
With this in mind, I proposed a possible line of inquiry that would 
reduce this friction between individuals and states.  
In order to reconcile international human mobility with 
territorial states, my proposal consisted of opening the possibility 
for conceiving of state membership as a question of individual 
choice. State borders would not be abolished, but redefined in terms 
of jurisdiction that does not depend on border control or unilateral 
exclusion. As we saw when discussing states’ territorial rights, the 
right to jurisdiction is commonly seen as inseparable from the right 
to border control. However, these rights are distinct from one 
another. While the right to jurisdiction is a right to rule everything 
and everyone within the borders, the right to border control is a 
right to rule outside them. Communitarians, but also some 
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cosmopolitans, have argued that, although different, these rights 
cannot be exercised independently from one another. According to 
them, this is because the right to rule within borders depends on 
the right to determine the subjects. This perspective, considering 
the right to jurisdiction and the right to border control dependent 
on one another initially allowed for two solutions: (1) to defend 
border control in order to protect state sovereignty, or the 
sovereignty of states’ national citizens over a state jurisdiction; and 
(2) to reject both rights implying the rejection of the institution of 
the states as sovereign entities. None of them, however, were, 
conciliatory enough to reduce the friction between mobile 
individuals and states. The first was too conceding to states and 
state members (state-centric) and the second, too conceding to 
mobile individuals (individual-centric). The problem with the 
second solution was not exactly excessive individual freedom, but 
the lack of structure to promote and protect mobility and other 
individual freedoms that are today still organised at the state level.  
In the first paper, among other conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism, I analysed Seyla Benhabib’s cosmopolitan 
account, which aims to conciliate the tensions between mobile 
individuals and states. However, although defending the right to 
state membership, by proposing “porous borders” and keeping the 
states’ discretionary right to border control, Benhabib’s argument 
falls into the first type of solution listed above, ending up with 
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being excessively state-centric and failing to find the reconciliation 
sought for. This is because, despite the exigencies for transparent 
admission procedures, porous borders, in practice, are still prone to 
be a selectively unjust mechanism favouring, for example, skilled 
immigration at the expense of others. A system not very different 
from what we have today, which is generating many problems for 
states and individuals. The gap seemed to still be open. In order to 
attempt to fill it, I showed that even if state membership necessarily 
entails exclusion, a more reconciliatory solution, sensitive to 
individual freedoms, should allow this exclusion to be self-inflicted.  
This possibility of thinking of state membership as a question 
of individual choice opened the space for a third solution. From a 
cosmopolitan approach, I argued that the claim to determine the 
subjects, in the context of liberal democracies, is to be detached 
from the right to rule. This is because liberal democracies are 
defined by the commitment to some values that, as opposed to 
classic sovereign states, compel them to be more inclusive in their 
practices in the name of consistency. In the thesis, this detachment 
was discussed according to three perspectives: territorial (consisting 
of geographic and civic borders) (Ch. II), political borders (Ch. III), 
and the borders of the welfare states (Ch. IV).  
Discussing the role of territorial borders, I argued that the 
objections to mobility being conceived of as a question of individual 
choice supported by states’ territorial rights are outdated and, 
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therefore, inconsistent with the contemporary ideal of liberal 
democracies. This is because, as opposed to nations, liberal 
democratic states do not have a connection to a particular 
geographical piece of land that is meaningful enough to enable them 
to justify exclusive right to settlement without compromising 
individual freedom, nor can they coherently maintain their right to 
unilateral coercion over non-members without compromising 
democracy. The main objection to this argument is to say that 
democracy needs borders and civic distinction as practical 
requirements of representative systems. Thus, state membership 
cannot be a question of individual choice, because of the need for a 
bounded demos. However, because this view violates the individual 
self-governing principle, existing alternatives have explored the 
possibility of conceiving a rather unbounded demos. These 
alternatives, although claiming to achieve theoretical consistency 
between liberalism and democracy, have not solve the problem of 
representability that a global demos would impose. My original 
solution was then to propose the institution of what I called a “non-
pre-bounded demos”, a demos that would still be composed by 
defined members, but where membership would not be determined 
by the states, but rather, by individual choice to participate in the 
life of such states. This proposal would not encounter the same 
problems as the other two alternatives, since it does not seem to 
violate the individual autonomy principle, nor does it fall into the 
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representability problem that an unlimited demos might pose. The 
idea of conceiving a “non-pre-bounded demos” still needs to be 
further developed in future research, but for the purposes of this 
thesis, it certainly embodies the core aim of opening the possibility 
for thinking of state membership as a question of individual choice. 
State members would then become something similar to the 
passengers of a bus. The bus has a fixed trajectory, but the 
passengers change constantly throughout the day. 
Discussing the role of political borders, I argued that the 
objections to state membership being a question of individual 
choice are, to a great extent, mistakenly justified through the appeal 
to nationhood. There are different forms of membership that 
require different justifications. Nationhood requires the fulfilment 
of some conditions (i.e., conformity to a certain cultural identity) 
and the external attestation of actual members (i.e., the recognition 
and acceptance of such conformity by the group one wants to 
become a member of). State membership in liberal democracies 
committed to tolerance and pluralism, on the other hand, should 
not impose such cultural conformity on its members and national 
identity should not affect the distribution of rights entitled to state 
members. This is because the role of these states should no longer 
be one of manufacturing homogeneity, but rather, of managing 
heterogeneity within a certain jurisdiction and enabling the exercise 
of choice. The main objection to this position is that the 
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multicultural project has failed and that is why culture is 
increasingly being politicized today. However, the argument 
defended here could then be reframed in the context of to the 
Human Rights Declaration as a claim for non-discrimination. 
Discussing the borders of welfare states, my concern was 
directed towards addressing the kind of objections that could attack 
my claim for producing harmful consequences if it was 
implemented. That is, those objections that, even if accepting that 
state membership should be a question of individual choice, could 
stress the gap between theory and practice and claim that the 
implementation of such a theory would be disastrous. Many 
objections fell into this category, such as the arguments on national 
security and public order. But because of the limited scope of this 
thesis, they could not be addressed here. My choice was to deal with 
the objection that I considered the most challenging and, therefore, 
the most controversial: the welfare states. Since Milton Friedman, 
the established understanding is that free mobility of persons across 
borders is incompatible with a welfare state. I problematized the 
certainty to which this trade-off has been portrayed in order to show 
that the welfare objection to international freedom of human 
mobility could potentially be overcome. 
I first argued from the perspective of economic theories that 
consider immigration as a tool either for global or national 
economic growth, where the trade-off seems to emerge as economic 
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and social strains. As we saw, economic strain was based on the risk 
of overwhelming fiscal stress provoked by the outnumbering of tax 
receivers over taxpayers, and the social strain lay in the danger of 
social heterogeneity to compromise welfare states' public support. 
However, these strains were both shown to be contested. From the 
economic perspective, rather than provoking a fiscal stress, 
immigration has contributed to maintaining the fiscal balance of 
countries with low or negative natural population growth. From the 
social perspective, the old empirical studies used to support the 
claim that heterogeneity provokes a loss of public support for 
welfare regimes are now challenged by more complete studies that 
take into account dynamic and more subjective factors relating to 
the causes and consequences of immigration. Furthermore, even if 
the increase of social heterogeneity was perceived as a threat for the 
wellbeing of the natives, it is possible that the overwhelmed threat 
would increase rather than decrease the welfare states' public 
support since a bigger safety net would be more needed in unstable 
times. In this sense, removing the legal barriers that prevent human 
mobility across borders would not necessarily hinder welfare states 
as commonly expected. More empirical research is needed to 
establish this relationship, but what we already can say is that the 
alleged trade-off is, at least, questionable.  
I then argued from outside the perspective of economics in 
order to show that this trade-off between freedom of international 
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mobility and welfare states is based on an over-simplistic 
conception of the individual as a selfish being, incapable of 
accepting economic losses to improve the wellbeing of others. I 
contested the approach on rationality for imprisoning human beings 
into being always target-oriented for success in pre-determined 
ways. Rationality is thought to allow for thinking and the exercise 
of the choice of whether to gain or to lose. I rejected the intrinsic 
role attributed to economics in human affairs and showed that 
economics, and not human mobility, should be a tool for improving 
the overall wellbeing of free and equal persons. Considering the 
intrinsic value of human mobility, state membership being a 
question of individual choice would enable persons to exercise their 
full rational capacity as autonomous beings.  
I am entirely conscious that my response might not be the 
only way of achieving this reconciliation between international 
human mobility and territorial states and I do not intend to be 
conclusive on the matter either. Indeed, writing a few hundred 
pages in four years on this vast topic of migration and borders could 
not exhaust the theme. The circumstantial objections to 
international freedom of mobility are several. Concerns with 
national security and public order, for example, escaped the scope in 
this work entirely. My goal was, rather, to reject some of the 
influential arguments that endorse restrictions on human mobility 
or the abolition of states’ jurisdictions, and to offer an account on 
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some of the aspects that a reconciliation may entail. Although the 
implementation of freedom of mobility across borders certainly 
needs a deeper understanding of its conditions and consequences, 
we can already see how conceiving of state membership as a 
question of individual choice seems to emerge as a promising 
alternative for a possible line of activity in the future when analysed 
under the perspectives discussed in this thesis. Further research 
with reconciliatory purpose on the matter is urgently needed and 
essential; urgently needed because border control is already on its 
way to collapse independently of the theories that attempt to justify 
it, and essential, because interdisciplinary approaches can contribute 
to securing a stable transition from border control to freedom of 
mobility across borders and reduce the frictions that a natural 
process will produce.  
 
  





The growing hostility against immigrants around the world has brought 
the debate on immigration and borders back to the core of moral and 
political philosophy. On the one hand, there is increasing pressure for 
international human mobility driven by, for example, globalisation, war 
and conflicts, economic development, family union, career development, 
and climate change. On the other hand, there are territorial states 
attempting to control the movement of persons across borders in order to 
preserve their sovereignty. The tension arises when, bond by human 
rights, liberal democratic states can no longer manage the effects of these 
pressures and determine emigration and immigration policies only 
according to their national agendas without compromising international 
relations. This thesis aims to examine some ways in which the free 
movement of persons across borders could be reconciled with states’ 
jurisdictions. While international human mobility is defended as a claim 
for freedom of choice and equality of opportunities, states are seen as 
contingent institutions currently responsible for the distribution and 
enforcement of these rights. The main claim of the thesis is that freedom 
of mobility across borders can be reconciled with territorial states if state 
membership becomes a question of individual choice (Ch. I). The rest of 
the thesis is devoted to arguing that state membership should (Ch. II, III) 
and can (Ch. IV) become a question of individual choice. At the 
normative level, I contest the role of state borders (Ch. II) and of state 
membership (Ch. III) as endorsing legal barriers for international human 
mobility and political participation. At the circumstantial level, my 
concern was directed to addressing the welfare objection to freedom of 
mobility and membership (Ch. IV).  
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Den 29. September publiserte prosjektet Missing Migrants en 
rapport som viser at til nå i 2015 har det vært nesten 4.000 dødsfall 
i verden knyttet til grensepasseringer. Dette betyr at i år har 
gjennomsnittlig 14 personer per dag mistet livet i håp om et bedre 
liv. For en knapp måned siden ble verden sjokkert av bildet av den 
tre år gamle gutten Aylan Kurdi liggende livløs på en tyrkisk strand. 
Antallet slike hendelser er stigende i likhet med graden av 
fortvilelse. Hendelsene i Middelhavet er en tragedie i seg selv, men 
andre steder i verden dør mennesker i samme situasjon når de 
prøver å krysse stengte grenser. Noen dør av kvelning på lasteplan, 
andre av vannmangel i en ørken mens andre blir skutt av 
grensepoliti eller av smuglere. Disse tilbakevendende hendelsene 
har provosert frem flere typer reaksjoner: fra sterke uttrykk av 
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humanistisk medfølelse og solidaritet, og til proteksjonistisk, 
intoleranse og rasisme. 
I den proteksjonistiske argumentasjonen blir flyktninger ofte 
sett på med skepsis. De blir oppfattet som upålitelige vesener som, 
til forskjell fra  Aylan Kurdi,  ikke har navn, alder eller ansikter. De 
blir heller fremstilt som en uønsket gruppe i transitt eller , som 
«rømte fanger». På det økonomisk planet blir flyktninger fremstilt 
som en fare for bærekraften i velferdsstaten, samt at de som får 
jobber «stjeler» disse fra vestlige borgere, eller det som blir sett på 
som «våre egne slektninger». På den andre siden finner vi imidlertid  
de som også inntar et humanistisk perspektiv i debatten om og 
rundt flyktninge-krisene. Her ses ikke flyktninger på som 
ansiktsløse rømte fanger, men som mennesker med både en historie 
og håp om en bedre fremtid for seg og sine, men som uforskyldt har 
havnet i en desperat og kritisk livssituasjon.  
Etter min oppfatning som immigrasjonsforsker, mangler 
begge disse perspektivene en full aksept av andre som frie og 
likeverdige personer. Innenfor det velmenende humanistiske 
perspektivet synes det som om at oppmerksomheten først og fremst 
blir rettet mot hjelp til mennesker som er påført en form for 
funksjonshemming, og ikke selvstendige mennesker som 
simpelthen er fordrevet fra hus og hjem. I stedet for å se på 
flyktninger som selvstendige personer med individuelle evner, 
forutsetninger og preferanser, synes det humanistiske perspektivet å 
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redusere dem til en hjelpetrengende gruppe. Noen av dem er høyt 
kompetente leger; andre er snekkere. Enkelte liker pasta mens andre 
foretrekker poteter; noen foretrekker klassisk musikk mens andre 
har en preferanse for hip-hop. Vi kan også gå ut fra at flyktninger, 
på samme måte som oss, ønsker å bestemme selv når man skal dra 
på en konsert eller på kino, og ikke la valget bli tatt av velmenende 
administratorer av flyktningmottak. Med andre ord, det er gode 
grunner til å anta at flyktninger, her forstått som ”de andre”, ikke er 
radikalt forskjellig fra våre egne slektninger.  
Her vil jeg understreke at jeg ikke mener at skillet mellom ”de 
andre” og "slektninger" er eller bør utviskes, og at det alltid er 
moralsk galt å gi et fortrinn for den ene over den andre. Poenget 
mitt er at selv om det normalt er slik at moralsk upartiskhet er å 
foretrekke, vil det også finnes situasjoner hvor det motsatte er rett. 
For eksempel, dersom min søster blir syk og ikke har ressurser til å 
betale for behandlingen, så vil det være forventet av meg å støtte 
henne dersom jeg kan (i dette tilfellet økonomisk). Dersom jeg 
skulle unnlate å gjøre dette, og i stedet bruke pengene på å hjelpe 
haitianere i Brasil, vil unnlatelsen med rette kunne kritiseres. 
Poenget her er at jeg simpelthen ville bli betraktet som en hjerteløs 
og dårlig søster, selv om nettoeffekten av hjelpen vil være større 
dersom jeg valgte å hjelpe flere mennesker enn min søster for 
samme sum penger.   Et sannsynlig utfall i dette eksemplet er at jeg 
trolig ville blitt utstøtt av min egen familie fordi jeg ikke klarte å 
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gjøre det som forventes av et godt menneske i forhold til sine 
nærmeste. 
Selv om vi bør ha de sterkeste moralske forpliktelsene overfor 
våre nærmeste, så følger det ikke av det at vi ikke også kan eller bør 
ha moralske forpliktelser overfor de som står utenfor den nærmeste 
sirkelen. Dette tyder på at en ren proteksjonistisk tilnærming 
vanskelig lar seg begrunne moralsk. På den andre siden virker det 
også som det humanistiske perspektivet omgår den egentlige 
årsaken til flyktningkrisene vi opplever.  Den viktigste assistanse 
som flyktningene trenger er ikke donasjon av private penger eller en 
tur til en konsert, men like muligheter og frihet til å velge hvor og 
hvordan de skal leve sine liv. Like muligheter betyr at en person født 
i et underutviklet land kan kompensere for dette ved å flytte til mer 
lovende steder.  Denne typen av likhet kan oppnås bare ved å fjerne 
de juridiske barrierer som hindrer deres bevegelsesfrihet, noe som 
er den faktiske årsaken til flest antall dødsfall knyttet til 
grensepasseringer. Bevegelsesfrihet, som allerede er anerkjent i 
Menneskerettighetserklæringen (ennå begrenset til nasjonalt nivå) 
betyr at uansett hvor en person blir født, skal hun være i stand til å 
flytte til et annet sted som bedre svarer til hennes ambisjoner i livet. 
Rasisme er galt, og flyktningene trenger ikke bare medfølelse som et 
middel for å løse krisen. De fortjener rettferdighet i sted. 
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